Page 175 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE NAVAL STRATEGIES OF THE MAJOR POWERS 161

compliant Spain, or to find ways to extend or defend their interests by taking ad-
vantage of Spain's geographic position <9>.
The Spanish war therefore became a magnet that drew in ali the European
powers. Hitler and Mussolini early and separately carne co che politica! and milita-
ry aid of Generai Franco's Nationalist rebels to gain leverage in a Francoist Spain,
oudlank France, and defeat Bolshevism. With the failure of a quick success against
the Popular Front Spanish Republic and driven by their ambitions, Mussolini esca-
lated ltalian intervention to gain the military victory and to position himself for
the breakout of Italia n power in t o the Atlanti c world .. Hi der, o n the other han d,
restricted his aid while encouraging Mussolini, in order to promote a major dash
there among other powers as a diversion from his rearmament and ambitions in
Centrai Europe. Mussòlini, who fancied himself as being so politically astute that
he could manipulate Hitler, thus played into Hider's hands as ltaly weakened itself
in a seemingly endless war in Spain. Léon Blum of France at first despatched aid
to a kindred Popular Front in Madrid, but backed off a commitment for fear'of
domestic polarization and diplomatic isolation from Britain. The Soviet Union then
took up the slack to ship military aid to the Spanish Republic to prevent a Fascist
victory, bolster French will, and form an anti-Fascist politica! front. The effect was
to protract the Spanish war for rwo and a half years, while Europe slid ever more
steeply toward war < >.
10
Politically ltaly and Germany cooperateci closely over Spanish issues, forging
the Axis and contributing to the pola~ization of Europe. Yet in Spain they fought
separate parallel wars that mirrored their strategie and operational proclivities and
exposed their lack of operational integration.
The Axis aero-naval war concentrateci on the contro! of maritime communi-
cations. ltaly firmly transformed Mallorca in the Balearics into a major operating
base for war on Soviet and Spanish Republican shipping, just as Mussolini wished
to use it in a war against France, athwart whose Mediterranean strategie routes
the Balearics lay o o. Both ltaly and Germany utilized clandestine submarine war-
fare against shipping, ltaly periodically from November 1936 until February 1938,
and Germany in November and December 1936. Neither paid the least attention
to the traditionallaw of capture at s~a enshrined in the Submarine Protocol that
they had just signed. ltalian submarines operating from ltalian, and later Spanish,
bases preyed upon shipping in the western Mediterranean, the Sicilian Channel,
2
and the Aegean, much as they anticipateci doing in a major war 0 >. New German
U-boats of the VIIA type slipped into the Mediterranean, waged war along Spanish
sea lanes and off its Mediterranean ports, and returned to Germany without disco-.
very or refueling, just as the type had been designed to do against French commu-
nications in these very waters <B>. Even after Germany abandoned secret submarine
warfare in December 1936 as being too politically risky, U-boats continued to
make constane cruises to Spanish seas, from which they were ready to operate ei-
ther against the Spanish Republic or, in the case of a European conflict, against