Page 249 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN
November 1942 - May 1943

). DAVID BROWN

InJuly 1942, persuaded by the British Government that a landing on the con-
tinent of Europe was not a near-term practical proposition, President Roosevelt
and che US Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to an amphibious assault and campaign,
the object of which was to occupy che Vichy French North African territories, from
Morocco to Tunisia, with initiallandings in three principal areas- around Casa-
blanca, Oran and Algiers. Planning began on 6 August 1942 and the first assault
convoys left the UK for the Mediterranean targets on 22 October; the wholly Ame-
rican forces which were to take Morocco sailed from US ports a day later, as the
Battle of El Alamein opened.
When the Anglo-American Army went ashore on 8 November 1942 to seize
Oran and Algiers the naval war in the Mediterranean was then in its 30th month.
· In many ways, the contest at sea ha~ epitomised ali the experiences and lessons
of the previous millenia of mariti me war, from the high doctrinal principles which
are today expressed as "Sea Contro!" and "Sea Denial", down to the realities of
the effects of wind and weather and understanding that "Decisive" naval battles
usually mark the end of phases, not wars or campaigns. lt was as a cruel trick of
fate and politics that pitted the Royal Navy against the Regia Marina as that which
found ltaly on the same side as Austria and the war that they fought was without
the rancour and bitterness which was to be found in other theatres. .
The war in the Mediterranean differed in another way, and one which I belie-
ve to ha ve been unique. The strategie objectives of the opponents were not the sa-
me - for the British che Mediterranean was a maritime theatre, whereas the ltalians
were defending a colony, later in alliance with German forces who were fighting
for a bastion of continental Europe. But for both navies the day-to-day task was
the support and supply of the armies in North Africa, both directly and by denial
of the other side's logistic support.
This led to the curious situation whereby the logistic supply lines actually cros-
sed, with the British shipping routes supplying Malta intersecting with the Axis
routes between ltaly and Libya. For more than two years, therefore, the antagonists
developed and employed every conceivable form of attack and defence in these wa-
ters. By November 1942, the experience and the quality were present, the unilita-
ries were the quantity and the endurance.
On paper, and looking at the map, the distances favoured the Axis, once it
was decided that Tunisia was to be occupied in force. Bizerta is no more than 200