Page 250 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

236 ). DAVID BROWN

km from the nearest porc in Sicily and only 650km from Naples, whereas Algiers,
630 km west ofBizerta and che besc-equipped harbour in Algeria, is 3,000km from
Great Britain by che shortesc sea route and nearly double thac discance by che roure
which che U-boat offensive in the Atlantic made necessary. Ali things being equal,
che supply of an army whose main purpose was defensive and which was holding
a front line relacively dose co the forward ports should ha ve been a straightforward
matter. That i t was not was due in part to the cumulative effects of che previous
30 months on the Italian merchant fleet: by November 1942, Axis (predominantly
ltalian) merchant losses had so reduced the shipping 'pool' that there were no mo-
re than 175 ships totalling 600 000 tons which were suitable for the Tunisian and
Libyan routes. This was, however, a notional figure, for not all were serviceable
and there were other calls upon ships of the righe size and speed.
The other nain shortcoming was in the rear area logistics organisation. The
Sicilian ports a t which most of the ships loaded had themselves to be supplied with
materièle shipped from the ltalian mainland and Italian and German participants
bave commented that difficulties experienced in making up cargoes resulted in ships
sailing with far less chan cheir fullload simply because the forces in Tunisia could
not wait.
On arrivai at Tunis and Bizerta, where the port facilities were less well deve-
loped chan in Tripoli or Benghazi and whose civilian stevedoring workforce deser-
ted en masse when threatened by air raids, ships took up to five days to unload
even wich soldiers unloading the reduced cargoes, which initially averaged only about
1,200 tons per ship which arrived safely.
Safe arrivai was not altogether in the hands of the organisation responsible
for delivery, which was led by the German Field .Marshal Kesselring, a soldier tur-
ned Luftwaffe generai who having been made responsible for the delivery of sup-
plies to Mrica was controlling a major element of che ltalian Navy. The short passage
of the Sicilian Straits could usually be made during the hours of darkness, but ex-
perience on the Libyan routes had shown that this was no guarantee against sub-
marines, torpedo aircraft or, most dangerous of all, surface warships, and the
alternative of round-about evasive routeing was not an option when the ports of
departure and arrivai were so dose. The only remedy was a combination of direct
protection by surface warshi ps in as great strengch- -as possible and the laying of
defensive minefields on the flanks of the most heavily used routes.
The Axis had just one form of transport which at this stage could still outper-
form its Allied equivalent. The Luftwaffe which in late 1942 was heavily committed
to supporting the armies in front of Stalingrad could stili spare 670 Junkers 52s
to lift tens of thousands of soldiers into Tunisia - 14 000 in two weeks in N ovem-
ber and l 7 000 during December - as well as Luftwaffe ground crews and essential
equipment. 29 000 troops arrived by during the corresponding period, most of
them brought from Sardinia by ltalian destroyers diverted from the minelaying task
and any prospect of defensive operations against British shipping.