Page 253 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996
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THE NORTH  AFRICAN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER  1942 · MAY  1943               239

      again increased the volume of individuai cargoes, to 2300 tons per ship, compared
      with 1300 tons in December, and 60 000 tons of fuel and stores arrived. Only six
      outbound ships were sunk, bue elsewhere, at sea and in harbour, 23 ships engaged
      in  supporting che  Tunisian traffic were  sunk.
           The German commanders in Tunisia were as ready as any generals in history
      co  fight to che last ship, and could only see che shortfall in what they regarded as
      the absolute necessiti  es  for  fighting their campaign.  Hitler,  no w chat the disaster
      of Stalingrad was  over,  a t  las c reacted co  what h e sa w as  failurres  o n the part of
      Kesselring and che ltalian Navy. Karl Donicz, recently appoinced CinC of the Ger-
      man Navy, was nota deep admirer of the ltalian Navy and meeting Mussolini and
      che  Chief of Staff of the ltalian  Navy in mid-March  1943, he  was  able  to insist
      on the creation of a  German-led Naval Operations Division in Rome to assume
      responsibility for the Tunisian traffic. Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, who had con-
      siderable experience of directing convoy escort operations in norch-west Europe,
      was soon appoinced and quickly realised that the problems in his new theatre were
      not those  of method  or motivation,  but of means  - the  freighters  were  coo  few
      in  number and were being lost fascer  than they  could be replaced,  as  were cheir
      escorts - seventeen destroyers and corvettes had been losc to enemy action in four
      months and three had been so  badly damaged chac they did not return to service
      before the Armistice.
           In practice,  nothing could save che  Axis  armies  in Norch Africa. The Allies
      were closing che noose around Tunisia in overwhelming strength and if their mili-
      tary talent was perhaps limited, the logistics support most certainly was not, with
      nearly half a million tons of stores and fuel arriving every month. The Axis supply
      organisation loaded more supplies into more ships  during March  1943, bue  less
      (50 000 cons) got through than in February for thirteen ships were sunk on passage
      and two were forced co  turn back after sus~aining damage. Greater use was made
      of landing craft,  which transporced virtually ali vehicles  and artillery bound for
      Tunisia, and among che  37  ships which sailed during the month were nine une-
      scorced German transports which relied on their relatively high speed of 14 knots
      co get them across the Narrows under cover of darkness: this boldness was rewar-
      ded  for  only  one  of them was  sunk,  by  a  mine.
           The last Allied shipping losses occurred in late March  1943, when four loa-
      ded merchant ships were sunk off the Algerian coast by air attack. This brought
      the cotal casualties of che campaign co 42 troopships and freighters of 400 000 cons
      sunk and 42 ships of 237 000 tons damaged. In Aprii, an average of 13 000 tons
      of stores was being unloaded every day to  support the  final  drive  on Tunis and
      on  17  April,  the  cargo  unloaded reached  exceeded  29 000 tons.
           lt also exceeded ali Axis deliveries co Tunisia for the month of Aprii. Previous
      losses and the intensive Allied bombing of the loading ports reduced che cargo de-
      spatched co 48 000 cons and apart from the small German freighters, which conti-
      nued to lead charmed lives,  only five  merchant ships reached Tunisia or Bizerta.
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