Page 256 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

242 DEAN C. ALLARD

force included more than a hundred ships plus approximately 35 000 troops com-
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manded by the famed Generai George S. Patto n < >.
Torch also surfaced a number of criticai issues in amphibious doctrine. Based
upon pre-Pearl Harbor preparations, this and all other U.S. landings in both the
Atlantic and Pacific thesters recognized that unity of command over army and na-
val forces must be exercised by the senior naval commander during the assault phase.
Once the lodgement ashore was secure, however, overall command shifted to che
ground commander <7>. Much thought also was given to the timing of an opera-
don. To avoid the confusion of night landings, the Navy preferred an early mor-
ning assault preceded by naval and aerial attacks on enemy positions .. But, due
to its hope of maximizing the element of surprise, the Army demanded and obtai-
ned in North Africa a night landing without preliminary bombardment (S).
· Although some actention was in pre-1942 American exercises to using naval
guns to support troops after they were ashore, the Army traditionally distrusted
the accuracy of sea-based ordnance. This attitude did not change during Torch when,
as navalleaders themselves concluded, naval fire support was generally ineffecti-
ve <9>. lt was fortunate that opposition to the Allied invasions by French ground,
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naval, and air units in North Africa was short-lived and not always full-hearted < >.
Close air support was a more successful aspect ofTorch. Morocco, unlike fu-
ture amphibious objectives in the Mediterranean region, was outside the range of
Alli ed air. Hence, American planners included a force of o ne large and four small
U .S. aircraft carriers in Admiral Hewitt' s rask force. The aircraft embarked in eh o-
se ships neutralized French air opposition and attacked shore targets. In addirion,
the carriers embarked approximately 75 U.S. Army fighters that flew ashore after
an air strip was secured in the Casablanca area no. .
Although che. eventual contro! of major ports was always a vi tal objective of
Mediterranean amphibious campaigns, these operations typically began with lan-
dings over open beaches. At the rime of the Norch African operation, the U.S. did
not have large numbers of seagoing amphibious vessels, such as the LST and LCI,
capable of offloading sizeable numbers of tanks and troops. Bue in Marocco che
Navy operated many smaller personnellanding craft and LCMs and carried a few
Army-operated amphibious DUKW tractors to ferry men and supplies directly bec-
ween transport ships and che beach. Despite some confusion and delayed schedu-
les, che virai ship-to-shore phase of Torch succeeded in landing a sufficient American
force. But it was at a heavy cost. More than a third of che landing craft were lost
in the Moroccan operation, primarily due to the inexperience of naval boat crews
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and che hazards of night landings combined with heavy surf conditions 0 >. One
problem endemie in amphibious warfare was the tardy clearance of supplies from
the beach-head. If that task had been undertaken more efficiently during Torch,
repair personnel might have been available to salvage many of the lost amphibious
craft 03>.