Page 257 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE U.S. FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DURING WORLD WAR Il 243

After French forces in North Africa ended hostilities against the Allies and
joined the war effort against che Axis, the American Navy escablished bases ashore
and rurned its atcencion to the vical if often unappreciated task of protecting and
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using the sealanes to supporc che armies ashore 0 >. In the spring of 1943, the Axis
army in North Africa was surrounded in Tunisia by British troops advancing from
the easc, Anglo-American ground forces moving in from the wesc, and Allied na-
vies concrolling the maritime escape routes co che north. The enemy·s collapse mar-
ked a major viccory for Anglo-American land and seapower. During the final North
African campaign, more chan 275 000 German and ltalian croops became priso-
ners of war 05>.
Early in 1943, U.S. and British leaders agreed to continue co press che enemy
by attacking Sicily inJuly of that year. This was a far larger campaign than Torch.
In fact, one historians has called ic che "greatest amphibious operation in recorded
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history if measured by che strength of the initial effort"' 0 >. Eight U.S. and Bri-
tish division made assault landings on beaches at che southeastern end of che island.
About 470 000 Allied troops and 1400 American and British ships and seagoing
amphibious craft parcicipated during che total operation. 580 of the naval vessels
involved were in che U .S. task force commanded by Admiral Hewitt. It landed Ame-
rican troops originally embarked in North Afrkan ports. Once again Generai Pat-
ton was the senior U.S. ground commander <I7>.
Sicily demonstrated the considerable progress made in amphibious tactics since
the North African landings. Once again, at che Army's request, there was no preli-
minary shore bombardment. But, unlike the situation eight months earlier in North
Mrica, the American Navy's post-landing gunfire supporc was heavy and effective.
In one memorable engagement off Gela, a group of Admiral John Hall's cruisers
and destroyers moved dose inshore to repulse a major counterattack by enemy tanks
that threatened to wipe out the beachhead. That type of shooting stilled the doubts
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of many Army leaders about the value of naval guns 0 >.
In Sicily che U .S. Navy also denionstrated that massi ve quanti ti es of troops,
armor, and supplies could be landed over ocean beaches. Now available to che in-
vaders were sizeable numbers of LSTs, LCis, and amphibious DUKW trucks. The-
se supplemented the LCVs, LCMs, and other smaller craft that were prominent during
Torch. Sicily's hydrography, featuring false outlying beaches and then deep run-
nels along the coast itself, led the Navy's amphibious co use pontoon causeways
and other ingenious means to move men and cargoes ashore 09).
The invasion of Sicily also revealed that many problems remained to be sol-
ved. Once again, che congestion of supplies on the beachhead was a major difficul-
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ty < >. Carlo o·Este and other hiscorians criticize ground commanders, particularly
che British Generai Montgomery, for not making full use of naval forces co launch
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flanking assaults from che sea that might have isolaced enemy forces < n. Senior com-
manders also can be faulted for failing co interdice the retreat of more chan l 00 000
Axis troops from Sicily co the mainland of lcaly across the narrow strait a t Messina
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in the final days of the Sicilian campaign < >. Although the U.S. Army and Navy