Page 259 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE U.S. FLEET IN THE MEOITERRANEAN DURING \'(IORLD WAR II 24S

Prior to the Salerno landings, Generai Eisenhower demanded that the air for-
ces work more closely with the navy and army in planning and undertaking this
operati o n. Alli ed land-based air was considerably more effective than a t Sicily. In
the meantime, a five-carrier task force direcdy under Admiral Hewitt' s contro! pro-
27
tected the amphibious flotilla from Luftwaffe attacks < >.
In the months that followed the landing at Salerno, the United States and si-
ster navies continued to protect the Mediterranean sealanes from German air and
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naval attack < >. This allowed essential supplies and reinforcements to reach Ame-
rican, British, French, and other Allied troops as they struggled to advance up the
ltalian peninsula. In January 1944, the American Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry
commanded a task force that threatened the rear of the German army by landing
two divisions at Anzio, a position approximately 75 miles north of the major of
German resistance near Monte Cassino.
Winston Churchill was a major champion of the operation, which initially
appeared to be a success. But, over the next four months Allied forces were unable
to break out of the originai Anzio beachhead. Instead of turning the enemy' s posi-
tion, Anzio became a bloody stalemate. Historians now recognize that this failure
resulted primarily from the decision to commit a landing force that, in the words
of Carlo D'Este, "was far too small to a chieve its basic ai m of cutting the ... li n es
2
of communication" to the main German army < 9>.
Th.e climax of U.S. Navy's Mediterranean campaign carne in August 1944
with the conquest of southern France, which Samuel Eliot Morison termed "an
almost perfect amphibious operation from the point of view of training, timing,
Army-Navy-Air Force cooperation, performance and results" <3°>. The veteran Ad-
mirai Hewitt once again commanded the naval task force, composed predominan-
dy of U.S., but also including British, French, and other Allied ships. The immense
size of Mediterranean assault was suggested by the fact that 880 ships and seagoing
landing vessels were in the invasion flotilla. Hewitt initially landed five American
division on beaches between Toulon and Cannes. They were followed by hundreds
of thousands of additional troops, including large numbers of French soldiers. One
of the major lessons learned by the United States from its amphibious experience
was the essential·need for dose cooperation· betweenall participating organizations.
In southern France highly effective coordination was demonstrated on both the inter-
service an d international levels (3l).
In this operati o n, the U .S. Army at last agreed to undertake a daylight landing
preceded by heavy naval and air bombardment. Obviously, this involved the loss
of strategie surprise. But by using cover and deception techniques, and exploiting
the inherent mobility of seapower, alli ed forces were ab le to mislead the enemy
regarding the exact location of the landings. It also should be acknowledged that
che hard-pressed Germans had considerably weaker forces in southern France than
a t Sicily or Salerno <32).