Page 258 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

244 OEAN C. ALLARO

deserved praise for their generally effective cooperation in planning and underta-
king this operation, the coordination between the autonomous air forces and their
sister services was poor. Sin ce air officers refused to work closely with their Army
and Navy counterparts in planning, rehearsing, or undertaking this operation, com-
plete unity of command was not achieved. U nder these circumstance, efforts by
land-based air to isolate the Sicilian battlefield and to provide air cover for ground
and naval forces were less than completely successful. A specific and tragic exam-
ple of the results of inadeguate coordination was a paratroop operation on the night
of 11-12July 1943 during which 144 U.S. air transports flew at low altitudes over
Admiral Hall's task group, which had been the target of heavy enemy air attack.
Despite last-minute attempts to alert American gunners, many of Hall's ships ope-
ned fire on the Air Force planes. A number of air transports were shot down or
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damaged, resulting in a heavy loss of American li ves < 3>.
After Sicily ·was secured, American leaders agreed to invade Italy in Septem-
ber 1943 in return for a British promise to undertake the long-delayed invasion
of northern France in 1944. A major strategie goal of the Italian campaign was
to force the enemy to divert forces from other war fronts, including France. Initial
phases of this operation featured lodgements by British troops near the strait of
Messina and at Taranto. The main attack followed on the night of 8-9 September
when a 600-ship attack force under Admiral Hewitt, carrying six U.S. and British
division trained and loaded in North African and Sicilian ports, approached pre-
selected landing beaches near Salerno. The port of Naples, a major Allied objecti-
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ve, was only a few miles north of Salerno < 4>.
Severa! hours before these troops stormed ashore the world learned the stun-
ning news of ltaly' s armistice with the Allies. The timing of this ·announcement
allowed most of the ltalian Navy to escape and to join the Allies as cobelligerents.
But Rome's departure from the Axis alliance, a process that began with the Allied
victory in Sicily, was no surprise to the Germans whose troops were pouring into
the Italian peninsula. The German defenders specifically expected an attack at Sa-
lerno. As a result, the Allied invaders faced. a strong German force of almost 40 000
men. They mounted o ne of the most determined defenses of any W orld War II
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beachhead < 5>.
For more than a week Allied contro! of the Salerno plain was in doubt. The
Germans built up their forces co about 100 000 men, induding ·strong armored
formations. Naval and ground forces were the targets of repeated enemy air attacks.
The eventual success of the Allies in conquering the objective area and then in sei-
zing the port of Naples on l October, resulted from valor and skill both ashore
and afloat. Despite German minefields that initially forced them to make long run-
ins to the beach, naval amphibious units were able to build up men and supplies
in the objective area. The Germans did not match these maritime reinforcements.
Compared to Sicily, the time required to offload naval transports at Salerno was
reduced by more than a third. N a val gunfire support against tanks and other enemy
targets, often delivered from very dose ranges, also was a key to Allied victory < 6>.
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