Page 260 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996
P. 260

246                                                            DEAN  C.  AlLARD


                The southern France landings were a major success (33>.  The allies effectively
            swept German sea mines blocking.the approaches to the coast. Prior to the landings,
            air and naval forces  bombarded many enemy positions and in.terdicted supply li-
            nes into the objective area. Later they provided dose support for the forces ashore.
            Aircraft from a force of nine British and American escort carriers spotted for naval
            guns,  protected the  fleet,  and flew  armed reconnaissance missions  deep  into the
            interior of France. Al:nphibious craft, both large and small, offloaded massive quan-
            tities  of supplies  and troops.
                 Within two weeks of the initiallandings, the ports of Marseilles and Toulon
            fell to French troops. By the end of first month, forces landed in this area had pu-
            shed 400 miles north into France where they established a continuous front with
            the other Allied armies. In the meantime, through France's Mediterranean beaches
            aad ports - especially Marseilles - passed the massive manpower and logfstical
            requirements of modern warfare. In ali, between the August 1944 and the end of
            the European conflict nine months later, no less than 1.3 million troops and almost
            4.5  million tons  of long cargo moved  through the supply lines opened along the
            Mediterranean  coast (34>.
               .  Although  many British leaders  and  historians  viewed  southern  France as  a
            diversion that weakened the more-important campaign in Italy, there is  no doubt
            that this landing contributed significantly to Allied victory. The enemy was forced
            to make a major retreat. The shortage of major Allied ports on the European conti-
            nent following theJune 1944 Normandy inva~ion became less criticai with the ope-
            ning of Marseilles.  Further,  Southern  France,  not  ltaly,  was  the logica!  poi n t  to
            introduce French ground forces  into World War II.  Those units were equivalent
            to  eight  to  ten  American  division <35>.
                 In  closing this  brief account of a large and complex subject, let me  remind
            you that the United States Navy of today is giving· special attention to operations
            in the earth's littoral regions. Capabilities required for this type of warfare include
            amphibious landings, air and missile bombardment missions against shore targets,
            and the logistical support of armies fighting continental campaigns. Modern Ame-
            ricans vividly remember  the nation's hard-won amphibious successes  more than
            a half century ago in the island of the Pacific. But the nation's less-known experien-
            ce during the same period in the relatively resrricted waters of the Mediterranean,
            w h ere mari rime forces projected Alli ed power into the land masses of North Africa
            and Europe, may be even more relevant to naval requirements of the  1990s. The
            eventful World War II history of the U.S.  Navy in the Mediterranean also stands
            as a classic demonstration of the ability of seapower to influence events on the land
            masses  of the  world.
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