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THE U.S. FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DURING WORLD W AR Il 247

FOOTNOTES

(l) The exception is the basic American naval history ofWorld War II by Samuel E. Mor-
rison, History o[United States Naval Operations in World War Il (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947-62),
15 vols., which covers this story in detail in vols. Il, IX, and XI. There also is good coverage
in the standard naval history text formerly used at the U.S. Naval Academy, E.B. Potter, ed.,
Sea Power: A Nava/ History (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice·hall, 1960). Carlo D'Este and Alan
F. Wilt have written solid accounts, which are cited below, covering che role of all services in
the Sidly, Anzio, and Southern France operations. W e need similar scholarly histories addres-
sing the maritime aspects of Mediterranean operations. Indicative of the lack of attention co
this subject is Merrill L. Bartlett, ed., Assat1lt From the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious
Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983). Nota single Mediterranean operation is co-
vered in Bartlett's volume.
(2) See Morison, Naval Operations, vols. Il, IX, Xl, passim.
(3) Morison, Naval Operations, Il, 3-54. Other basic works on the North Mrican campaign
include Arthur L. Funk, The Politics o[Torch: The Allied Landings and the Algiers Putsch, 1942 (Law-
rence: University of Kansas Press, 1974); Keith Sainsbury, The North African Landings, 1942
(London: Davis-Poynter, 1976); and Mark A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front (Wescport:
Greenwood Press, 1977).
(4) A lengthy, unpublished biography ofHewitt, by John H. Clagget, completed in 1977,
is in box 605, World War Il Command File, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center,
Washington, D.C.
(5) For Hall, see Susan H. Godson, Viking of Assault: Admiral John Lesslie Hall, ]r., and
Amphibious Warfare (Washington: University Press of America, 1982).
(6) Morison, Naval Operations, II, 33, 43.
(7) See Kennech J. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare Developmenl in Britain and America [rom
1920-1940 (Laurens, N.Y.: Edgewood, 1983), 105.
(8) Morison, Naval Operations, Il, 25-26, 59-60. In North Africa there also was a politica!
decision to avoid a bombardment due to che hope (which was unrealized) that French military
forces would not resist the Allied invasion. See Godson, Viking of Assàult, p. 34-35.
(9) Clifford, Amphibious Warfare Development, p. 108. Discussions ofpre-1942 amphibious
doctrine also appear in George C. Dyer, The Amphibians Came T o Conqner; The Story of Admiral
Richmond K. Tnrner (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1972), vol. l, 223-27; Godson, Vi-
king of Assanlt, p. 44-45, 51; and Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 254-64.
(10) Morison, Naval Operations, II, 161-65.
(11) lbid., p. 31-32, 88-91.
(12) Godson, Viking of Assanlt, p. 44; Morison, Naval Operalions, II, 29; Potter, Sea Power,
p. 572·77. For details on amphibious ships and craft see ].D. Ladd, Assault From the Sea,
1939-1945: The Craft, The Landings, The Men (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1976). Clifford,
Amphibious \fl arfare Deve/opment, p. 15 3-58, refers co discussions prior to Torch that amphibious
craft would be manned by army instead of naval personnel. That option was rejected by the Navy.
(13) Morison, Naval Operations, Il, 159·61; Godson, Viking of Assanlt, p. 44.
(14) Morison, Nava/ Operations, Il, 244-58.