Page 265 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996
P. 265

THE  IMPORT ANCE  Of THE  BRAZIUAN NORTHEAST                            251

          The geostrategic value of che Northeastern bulge, che oceanic islands, che rela-
      tive infrastructure and che demographic concentration along che coast, make Bra-
      zii vulnerable co sea-air attacks from the Mediterranean and Northwest Africa. On
      che other hand, it places che  country in a key position for che joint defense of che
      American continent against military action  from  those  regions.

      The Axis threat
           After the fall ofFrance in 1940, the Allies' ~ituation deteriorated considerably
      in che  Mediterranean. The Riviera and the French colonies in North Africa carne
      under the Vichy Government"s contrai.  ltaly was  already pare of che  Axis.  Spain
      and  Portugal remained  neutra!,  although Franco had promised to  enter the war
      on the side ofGermany. The Nazis launched a Balkan offensive against Yugoslavia
      and Greece, taking over Salonika while the British Expeditionary Force retreated.
      The Afrika  Korps  reached  Egypt's  borders,  defeating the  English.
           After Japan joined the Axis in 1940, Hitler concentrated on planning a mili-
      tary offensive in the Mediterranean that could be executed before the planned at-
      tack  o n  the  Soviet  U nion.  H e envisaged  a  decisive  attack  against  Gibraltar an d
      Suez  as  che  best. alternative  co  che  failed  invasion  of Great Britain.
           Spain  would  attack Gibraltar in exchange  for  significant German military-
      economic aid, and would keep Gibraltar, French Marocco and Oran, besides ex-
      panding its West African colonies.  Germany promised to supply air and artillery
      support. The Germans also intended to extend their dominions in W est Africa and
      the adjacent Atlantic islands, thus rebuilding their former colonia} empire in Africa.
           In view of the unsuccessful English an4 Free French attack on Dakar, from
      23  co  25  September  1940,  Pétain  retaliated  by bombing Gibraltar.
           Hitler was particularly interested in occupying the Azores and Canary Islands
      in order co  install a  naval base in Dakar and an air base in the Azores,  creating
      che  conditions  for  future  operations  directed  against the  Uniced  Scaces.
           His  plans  presupposed  the  collaboration of Vichy  France,  ltaly and  Spain.
           The pianto conquer Africa and Gibraltar was  named "Operation Felix".  lt
      called for  the crossing of Spain by German forces  coming from  France on  lO Ja-
      nuary  1941. Simultaneously,  German aircraft based in France would  attack che
      warships  in  Gibraltar in  order to  deprive the fortress  of naval  artillery support.
      The offensive's spearhead would be led by German land forces.  The assault troop
      would  be followed  by  two  German divisions  - one armored and  one motorized
      - which would cross the strait, moving in the direction of Marocco to gai n contro!
      of che Adantic coast. Three other German divisions would cross Spain and remain
      in a waiting position at the Portuguese frontier, able to thwart any English landing
      attempts in  Portugal.  Spain, supported by German artillery,  would  reinforce che
      defense  of the Canary  Islands  against any anticipated English  threat.
          The plan an d  necessary reconnaissance for  subsequent operations in N orth-
      west Africa and against che Atlantic islands had not been concluded when "Opera-
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