Page 268 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

254 LUIZ P. MACEDO CARVALHO

As a result, the US pressured the Brazilian Government to nationalize the Axis
airlines operating in its territory, suspending their activities.
The Americans built a series of airports along two routes to Brazil: Miami
- Pueno Rico- Martinique- Trinidad- Dutch Guyana- Brazil and Texas- Panama
- Colombia - Venezuela - Brazil.
Joint North American and Brazilian plans were made for the defense of Nor-
theast Brazil, especially Nata!, Recife and Belém, in the Amazon estuary, as sites
of great strategie value. Brazil was responsible for supplying the necessary land for-
ces to complement the area's defense.
Fearing that the Brazilian Government did not have the means to defend the
Northeastern bulge, the US prepared the LILAC pian before Pearl Harbor, calling
for the distribution of US Iand forces around the air bases in Belém, Nata! and
Recife, concentrating their efforts in Parnamirim, Natal. Immediately, 15,000 troops
from the 9th lnfantry Division were made available, with indispensable air sup-
port and, as they became needed, reinforced by a further two echelons with 19,000
men each. Due to lack of sea transport and the urgent demand in other theaters
of operation, operation LILAC was confined to the initial force and would only
become operative at the end of 1942. The problem was averted and the pian aban-
doned due to Brazil's total cooperation and war effort.

Conclusion
The Mediterranean was, and always will be, an importane strategie area and
the stage for world conflicts. Without contro! of the Mediterranean there would
be no possibility of security for Europe, notwithstanding the fact that the centers
of economic-political-military power are no longer in the Mare Nostrum.
The main objective of US military strategy in the bygone days of 1940 was
to prevent the establishment of Axis bases in South America. The rapid develop-
ment of commerciai airlines in the late 1930s made this possibility a reality. Thus,
it was necessary to eliminate the airlines established by the Axis in Latin America,
obtain strategie bases and station troops on the Brazilian Northeast. The first two
objectives were easily achieved, but the US was unsuccessful in persuading Brazil
to request the presence of America n soldiers o n their territory.
The bulge of the Brazilian Northeast, which is closer to French W est Africa
than the nearest of the Caribbean islands, was vulnerable to attacks and incursions
by the Axis powers. The area was undefended, inaccessible by land to Brazilian
troops cdncentrated in the South, and out of reach to US combat aircraft based
in the Caribbean.
In 1941, when the US was preparing. its attack o n the Axis in the Mediterra-
nean, it was imperative to find an urgent solution to enable airplanes to cross the
Atlantic in the direction of North Africa, Middle East and the China-Burma-India
theater of war. The distances across the Pacific thwarted any move. There was the
alternative of Iceland, but only for small aircraft, without considering the threat