Page 267 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRAZIUAN NORTHEAST 253

no appropriate landing fields along the US roure to Brazil. As it happened, Pot
of Go/d was · finally canee led, partly o n due to insufficient resources.
The news that a German force of 6,000 men had sailed for the South Atlantic
also made Roosevelt order an emergency pian co occupy the Guyanas (Bricish, French
and Dutch), the Azores, Cape Verde and the Canary Islands, with Brazil supplying
troops for che defense of the Guyanas and the Azores.
The Allies also considered dispatching an expedicionary force to Dakar or Bricish
West Africa, further South, which also exceeded their available forces.
Concerned with the vulnerability ofFernando de Noronha Island and the bul-
ge of che Brazilian Northeast, and fearing German occupation, Roosevelt ordered
the fortification of the area and authorized the sale of arms to Brazil, in addition
to developing an airport-building program.
With the agreement of the Brazilian Government the Airport Development
Program (ADP) emerged, by which Pan American Airways built and improved a
network of airports to ensure direct air traffic from che US to Northeastern Brazil
and from there to Africa, with the twofold aims of controlling sea traffic in the
South Atlantic and allowing the air transportation of men and materiel.
This prompted the French Ambassador - Albert Kammerer - to officially
accuse Brazil of again trying to occupy Cayenne, while che German military aide,
Generai Giinther Niedenfuhr, issued a protese co che Brazilian government, consi-
dering the authorization to build American air and naval bases in the Norrheast
a "breach of neutrality" that allowed the transit of American aircraft and warships
co Africa through Brazilian territorial waters.
Up until then the Axis had controlled the airlines in South America, using
che bases in Brazil to reach the extreme south of the continent anç{ che Paci fie coast.
The German Condor airline, a subsidiary of Lufthansa, had covered che Brazilian
coast an d che interi or of South America for many years. Before the war, three airli-
nes had linked Europe to South America: Air France, LATI (Linea Aeree Tran-
scontinentali Italiane) and Lufthansa. Transatlantic flights in 1941 were limited
co o ne per week and were exclusively operated by LA TI, flying from Euro p e via
Cape Verde to Natal and Rio deJaneiro. Thus it was a safe means of communica-
cion for the Axis agents and for smuggling ~trategic minerals (crystals and diamonds).
In Europe, Air France and Lufthansa provided land support. From Natal to the
South, LATI and Air France, controlled by che Vichy Government, monopolized
air bases and airports along the coast, jcopardizing the defense of che Western He-
misphere, navigation and British patrols in South Adantic waters. Condor employed
Luftwaffe pilots under a shift system, co get them familiarized with che terrain and
flying conditions in South America. There were suspicions that Condor and LA TI
made reconnaissance flights along the coast to detect English warships and help
Axis ships to break through che naval blockade. Suddenly, LATI increased its acti-
vities in the transatlantic roure, coinciding with the intensification of the German
submarine campaign against British ships in che South Atlantic.