Page 329 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996
P. 329
U.S. NAVY PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AFTER THE SECOND WORLD W AR, AND THE ROLE
OF THE SIXTH FLEET IN THE 1960's AND 1970's
PAOLO E. COLETIA
Two Russian researchers in recently opened Russian archives on Soviet Cold
War policy between 1945 and 1962 conclude thar it was shaped by there major
factors: a revolutionary-inspired paradigm that blended Marxism with messianic
tsarist geopolitica! goals; che policies of che W est, particularly of che United States;
and the personalities ofJoseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and four party apparat-
chiks. The ultimate goal remained communist world revolution, which sea power
could sponsor O>.
Six phases in the evolution of the Soviet Navy since World War II ha ve been
defined:
1945-1953. Poscwar Recovery Phase
1953-1956. Post-Stalin Retrenchment
1956-1961. Counter Massive Retaliation Phase
1961-1964. Transition Phase
1964-1968. Shift to Blue Warer Phase
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1968 to che Present. Decente, Soviet Sryle < >.
After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin saw how "the bomb" could support
Soviet security, yet he wanted naval power with which co interdice any American
supplies an d military force se n t to W ester n Europe. By che ti me of his dea rh in
1953 his fleet contained more than 300 submarines, 8 heavy cruisers, 15 light crui-
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sers, and 60 destroyers < >. His successor, Nikita Khruschchev, who did not un-
derstand sea power, reduced his naval building program excepr for submarines-yet
in innovative fashion he acquired long-range nuclear missiles. These missiles would
eirher take out American aircraft carriers before they launched their aircraft or che
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aircraft before they delivered their weapons < >.
W i rh U .S. military forcs quickly reduced to near impotence after W orld War
II, the alert Soviets prompdy filled che power vacuum createci in Eastern Europe.
Short of using atomic weapons, the United States could neither force them to
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honor their wartime agreements nor stop their territorial expanion < >, but an
American fleet in the Mediterranean might at least deter them. This fleet would
exercise ics command of the sea in a periperhal strategy in which particularly its

