Page 329 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996
P. 329

U.S.  NAVY  PRESENCE  IN THE  MEDITERRANEAN
            AFTER THE SECOND WORLD  W AR,  AND THE  ROLE
              OF  THE SIXTH  FLEET  IN THE  1960's  AND  1970's



                                                              PAOLO  E.  COLETIA





           Two Russian researchers in recently opened Russian archives on Soviet Cold
      War policy between  1945 and  1962 conclude thar it was  shaped by there major
      factors:  a revolutionary-inspired  paradigm that blended Marxism with  messianic
      tsarist geopolitica! goals; che policies of che W est, particularly of che United States;
      and the personalities ofJoseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and four party apparat-
      chiks. The ultimate goal remained communist world revolution, which sea power
      could  sponsor O>.
           Six phases in the evolution of the Soviet Navy since World War II ha ve been
      defined:
                   1945-1953.      Poscwar  Recovery  Phase
                   1953-1956.      Post-Stalin  Retrenchment
                   1956-1961.      Counter  Massive  Retaliation  Phase
                   1961-1964.      Transition  Phase
                   1964-1968.      Shift  to  Blue  Warer  Phase
                                                           2
                   1968  to  che  Present.  Decente,  Soviet Sryle < >.
           After  Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin  saw  how  "the bomb"  could support
      Soviet security, yet he wanted naval power with which co  interdice any American
      supplies an d  military force  se n t  to W ester n  Europe.  By  che  ti me  of his  dea rh  in
       1953 his fleet contained more than 300 submarines, 8 heavy cruisers, 15 light crui-
                             3
      sers,  and 60 destroyers < >.  His  successor,  Nikita  Khruschchev,  who  did  not un-
      derstand sea power, reduced his naval building program excepr for submarines-yet
       in innovative fashion he acquired long-range nuclear missiles. These missiles would
      eirher take out American aircraft carriers before they launched their aircraft or che
                                                4
      aircraft before  they  delivered  their  weapons < >.
           W i rh U .S. military forcs quickly reduced to near impotence after W orld War
      II, the alert Soviets  prompdy filled che  power vacuum createci  in Eastern Europe.
      Short  of using  atomic  weapons,  the  United  States  could  neither  force  them  to
                                                                        5
      honor  their  wartime  agreements  nor  stop  their  territorial  expanion < >,  but  an
      American  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  might at least deter  them.  This  fleet  would
      exercise ics  command of the sea  in  a  periperhal strategy in which  particularly its
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