Page 332 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996
P. 332

318                                                          PAOLO E.  COLETT A


                Until President Nixon's Incidents at Sea  Agreement with Russia  of 15  May
           1972, some  Soviet ships engaged  in  harassment in  a  "game of chicken.,.  While
           seeking to penetrate screens about U.S.  carriers they caused collisions and someti-
                                                                      8
           mes loss of life. Ironically, Nixon, a former Cold War Warrior 0 >,  initiated aver-
           tures of detent with Communist Party boss Leonid Brezhnev.  Their SALT Treaty
           - vali d for five years an d renewed in 197 4 - a t least fixed the number of strategie
           weapons  each  side could  have.
                That Soviet ships could win a war in the Mediterranean was doubtful because
           they faced  not only the Sixth Fleet but some three hundred NATO ships (19>.  The
           CNO, Elmo Zumwalt, nevertheless concluded in 1973 that the United States could
           not contro! the Mediterranean,  for  during the Yom Kippur War of that year the
           Soviets almost doubled their Mediterranean Squadron and createci a series of inter-
           national crises.  Because these crises are addressed in papers that follo w,  no com-
           ment  is  offered about them.
                                                                                   2
                In  1978 the Unired States had 217 oceangoing warships, the Soviets, 454 < 0>.
           The Soviets reduced their number of ships in the Mediterranean until 1980 except
           during some antisubmarine and anti-carrier exercises and during the Cyprus crisis
           of July 1974 and Lebanese civil war of 1976. No U.S.-Soviet confrontation resulted.
                In sum, between  1967 and  1977 U.S.  Naval power had dropped by almost
           half while the Soviet navy registered its largest gains in history. Sadly lacking were
           America n generai purpose forces capable of projecting power and insuring sea con-
           tro!. Yer the United States had three carrier task groups, rwo amphibious task for-
           ces,  ASW  patrol aircraft,  and severa!  attack submarines  in the  Middle Sea.
                On 24 April1967 Brezhnev had demanded the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet.
           His demand went unanswered, but it was reiterated even while he stili further built
           up his Mediterranean Squadron. Meanwhile, the Soviets had suffered severa! set-
           backs.  First, a reinforced Sixth Fleet sped from Villefranche to the Eastern Medi-
           terranean during the Jordanian crisis of mid-July  1958 in spite of the presence of
           the  Soviet  Squadron.  Second,  Israel  defeated  Soviet-sponsored  Arab  states  in
                 2
           1967 < 0. Third, in a surprise move,  President Anwar Sadat of Egypt ordered So-
           viet advisers and military personnel, in his  country since  1955, to leave. Also  su-
           prisingly,  the  Soviets  agreed-but the order  was  soon  rescinded < >.
                                                                      22
                In conclusion, by the end of the 1970s the Soviet had greatly diminished U.S.
           influence in the Mediterranean, yet they stili faced a powerful threat from the Sixth
           Fleet.
   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337