Page 331 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

U.S. NAVY PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAK AFTER THE SECOND WORlD \'('AR 317

of 1956 and especially American naval forces in che Cuban missile crisis of 1962
undoubtedly determined che Soviets co speed up their oceangoing program. Rated
seventh in the world in 1942, a decade later their na vy would be rated as third <IO).
In 1964 Admiral Gorshkov would proclaim "an end ... co the complete domina-
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tion of che sea by che traditional naval powers < >.
The Soviet production of atomic and hydrogen bombs between 1949 and 1952,
of tactical and strategie missiles for ships nd submarines as well as for ics army
an d air force, an d the shock of sputnik caused che U nited States to overhaul ics
strategy in che "New Look" of the Eisenhower administration. This focused on nu-
clear deterrence and "Massi ve Retaliation". Because nuclear weapons give "more
bang for the buck", che New Look called for strategie air an d submarine power,
but in che absence of conventional forces any confrontation would result in a back-
down or a generai war. I t therefore denigrateci conventional forces that would be
needed in che 1960s and 1970s 0 >.
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Between 1957 and 1961 che Soviets shocked che world by launching an inter-
continental ballistic missile while che United States as yet had only intermediate
ones, putting a satellite into orbit in outer space, and in Aprii 1961 safely oribiting
a man about che earth 03>. During chose same years the U.S. Navy shrank by 15
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percent 0 >, bue che Sixth Fleet, beefed up in 1958 with an additional carrier and
Marine battalion landing team, remained che strongest force in che Medicerranean.
In che presidential election of 1960 Richard M. Nixon cook a hard line to-
ward che Soviets whileJohn F. Kennedy opposed America's reliance upon military
nuclear power. Kennedy won and adopted Gen. Maxwell Taylor's idea of "flexible
response": conventional forces would respond to challenges in which nuclear acti-
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vity would be ineffective or represent an irrational overreaction < ~>. H e increased
special forces five-fold, opted for counterinsurgency and additional conventional
forces, greatly speeded up che nuclear arms race and range of intercontinental mis-
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siles, and sent some of che last co che Mediterranean 0 >. Ics operations during che
Vietnam war, however, severely weakened his navy. Meanwhile, the Soviets acqui-
red more long-range land-based missiles and strategie missile-launching submari-
nes than che United States, armed many surface ships with anti-ship missiles, and
accelerated their naval ''forward deployment''.
In 1965 the average number of Soviet ships in che Mediterranean was three
surface ships, three submarines, and ten auxiliaries. In 1970 there were 24 surface
ships, at least 13 submarines, and 24 auxiliaries. At times, as in 1969, the Soviets
had as many as seventy, and during che Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and
other Near East crises of 1970 and 1972, ninety-six-chus outnumbering those of
che Sixth Fleet, usually composed of sixty-six. Now American "dogged" Soviets
rather than vice versa. The Soviets disregarded che Montreaux Convention of 1936
and passed ASW helicopter ships through che Dardanelles into the Mediterranean.
Their navy thus challenged the U.S. navy in every conventional category excepc
carriers 0 >.
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