Page 107 - 150° Anniversario II Guerra d'Indipendenza - Atti 5-6 novembre 2009

the austrian army in the War of 1859 107

Remarkably the official military history of the campaign of 1859 was
published only in 1872, six years after the decisive defeat in the war of 1866
against Prussia.
The first misunderstanding in Austria was the problem of a modern polit-
ical (or Grand) and military strategy.
The changing mentality of the growing population in the Habsburg
Empire, the consequences of the industrial revolution with the subsequent
expanding social problems, the lack of control and the competence to find
solutions for the rivalry of different nationalities inside the multiethnic state
was a slowly growing, but for some political observers clearly visible prob-
lem, which remained critical until the years of the First World War and could
be described as a „time bomb with a slow burning match”.
Halfheartedly executed political reforms could only postpone the danger-
ous effects of nationalism and separatism in the Habsburg monarchy and
although a rapid economic development took place after 1873, this never was
sufficient to create a modern industrialized country, because from 1867 to the
years of the First World War the Austro-Hungarian Empire could never com-
pete with the economic development of most of the European powers.
These social and economic benchmarks for creating military forces supe-
rior or even equal to those of other great powers in Europe could be clearly
observed in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Till the end of the 1840s the European armies were, in respect of their
armament, organization, training and command structures nearly homoge-
nous. The consequences and implications of the industrial revolution on the
military and the social and economical change created also a relatively fast
change of the balance of power to the disadvantage of Habsburg monarchy.
The use of a dense and effective railway system would improve the oper-
ational capabilities of good commanders, but also required a high speed in
military decisions.
High morale and fighting spirit, good marching qualities of well clothed,
well fed and adequately armed troops were necessary for concentrating the
available forces on the battlefield and to coerce the military decision in a mat-
ter of days, respectively hours.
The speed of the transport of the French Army to the theater of war in
Northern Italy was quite a nasty surprise for the Austrian military high com-
mand.
In 1859 Austrian brigades, divisions and army corps were inadequately
equipped general staff officers and other staff officiers. Compared to a French
infantry division in the campaign of 1859, which had a number of eight gen-