Page 104 - 150° Anniversario II Guerra d'Indipendenza - Atti 5-6 novembre 2009
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104          150° anniversario della ii Guerra d’indipendenza. atti del conveGno



                 command” - („Führungsgrundsätze” in German) in the Austrian army, which
                 led to military disaster.
                   Beginning with the supreme command, the difficulties are easily visible.
                   Until  1848  the  Hofkriegsrat  in  Vienna  (the  Court  War  Council)  was  a
                 clumsy institution, which was over long periods unable to organize an effec-
                 tive  army  and  make  successful  operations  of  the  forces  of  the  Habsburg
                 Empire possible.
                   The  establishment  of  the  „Kriegsministerium”,  the  Ministry  of  War  in
                 1849, gave only the possibility to reform the high command and the admin-
                 istration  of  the  army,  because  in  1851  the  Armeeoberkommando  (Army
                 Supreme Command) was created. The emperor – nominally the „Commander
                 in Chief” of the armed forces - tried to control the chain of command with his
                 „Militärzentralkanzlei”.
                   The real power of command was in the hands of the „Generaladjutantur”
                 (Bureau  of  the  Adjutant  General).  The  Director  of  the  Generaladjutantur,
                 Feldmarschallleutnant  Karl  Ludwig  Grünne,  undermined  with  the
                 „Adjutantencorps”  the  position  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army
                 Feldmarschallleutnant  Heinrich  Freiherr  von  Hess  systematically.  Grünne
                 also had a really negative influence on the operations of the Austrian forces
                 in Italy. His unclear and mostly unnecessary orders for his old friend and
                 commander of the Second Army, Feldzeugmeister (general of the artillery)
                 Franz  Graf  Giulay,  enlarged  the  chaotic  command  situation,  which  was
                 already bad enough through the military ineffectiveness of Giulay, who laid
                 down his command a week before the decisive battle of Solferino.
                   So  the  unity  of  command  failed  from  the  beginning  not  only  with  the
                 arrival of Hess on the 3  of June and of Emperor Franz Josef on the 17  of
                                                                                    th
                                       rd
                 June, who made Hess his Chief of staff and tried to command the now two
                 armies under Feldzeugmeister Graf Wimpffen (First Army) and General der
                 Kavallerie Graf Schlick (Second Army)
                   In 1859 the Austrian land forces were definitely not in a condition for
                 fighting a short and decisive war against French army units.
                   On paper the Austrian land forces consisted of four armies with twelve
                 Army Corps and three military governates (Temesvar, Agram, Dalmacia).
                   These four armies consisted of nominally 30 divisions with 78 brigades,
                 62 infantry-regiments (four of them came in 1851 from the territorial border
                 regiments of Transsylvania), 14 border infantry regiments, eight “Kaiserjäger”-
                 battalions and 32 battalions of light infantry (Jägerbataillone).
                   An Austrian army corps was composed of two to three Infantry divisions
                 with between one and three cavalry brigades.
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