Page 148 - Il Risorgimento e l'Europa - Attori e protagonisti dell’Unità d’Italia nel 150° anniversario - Atti 9-10 novembre 2010

148 Il RIsoRgImento e l’euRopa. attoRI e pRotagonIstI dell’unItà d’ItalIa.

were by no means in the situation to perform a powerful counterattack. To
conduct only a difficult defensive operation was a more realistic possibility
with more than a slight chance of success had the war gone on.
The only strategically important option for Austria resulted in the mobili-
sation (240.000 soldiers) and deployment of the Prussian army on the right
bank of the Rhine and also the same military steps of the southern members
of the German Union (“Deutscher Bund”), which meant Baden, Württemberg
and Bavaria. Because Napoleon III. had had deployed only about 100.000
French soldiers on his eastern border, this emerging threat was also a strong
and convincing argument to avoid a two-front war in Northern Italy and on
the Rhine and to get on with terms with Austria about the political situation
in Northern Italy in a very short time.
In reality also Prussia at this time had no intention to get involved in war
with France and the Prussian deployment of more than 132.000 soldiers was
more a political signal than a real military menace. 2
Graf Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army since 1857,
who worked intensively and meticulously on the improvement of the com-
mand structures, the mobility and fighting power of the Prussian Army
(which would emerge with uncontested military effectiveness in the wars of
1864 against Denmark, 1866 against Austria and its allies in Germany and
1870/71 against France), painstakingly and strictly observed the policy of
Austria, France and Russia and the development of their military forces.
The British Foreign Policy under Premierminister Lord Palmerston warm-
ly welcomed the unification of Italy. The constitutional monarchy of Piemont-
Sardinia and the policy of Count Cavour was held in high esteem by the
British foreign policy. A very interesting topic for the British naval policy was
the quite quick emergence of a new sea power –that of the kingdom of Italy
– in the Mediterranean in the first half of the sixties.
Great Britain sent clear signals to Prussia and France to avoid a war,
regarding the balance of power in Europe. Notwithstanding the military alli-
ance with France in the Crimean War, France was regarded as potential
th
enemy by Great Britain until the nineties of the 19 century. 3
So the peace treaty of Zürich 1859 was the first step for Austria in losing

2 Jost Dülffeer, Martin Kröger und Rolf-Harald Wippich, Vermiedene Kriege. Deeskalati-
on von Konflikten der Großmächte zwischen Krimkrieg und Erstem Weltkrieg, pgg.1856-
1914. München 1997.
3 Hans Kramer Österreich und das Risorgimento. Wien 1963. pgg.150-155.