Page 208 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

208 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

In the early nineteenth century, despite fluctuations, there was a boundary between
the areas of Spanish and Portuguese occupation in the Plata, which corresponded
approximately to the limits established by the Treaty of Madrid (1750). However,
regional political instability caused by the struggle for independence and by the civil war
between the provinces which had once formed the Viceroyalty of La Plata - which would
reach its peak in 1820 - would open new opportunities for the struggle over this border
that, although would have been the result of the Brazilian-Portuguese military successes
in the wars of 1801, 1811 and 1816, was the reflection of an de facto occupation, actually
done by the border population, in the spirit of the Treaty of 1750, which had dismantled
of once for ever the Line of Tordesillas (PICTURE 2).
Two well-defined policies were opposed. On one side, Buenos Aires - from the
manifest desire to reunite under its direction the old provinces of the former Viceroyalty,
or at least part of it - intended to reverse the situation established after 1801, extending
9
its domain to Missões, the territory east of the Uruguay River, and over those lands
between the rivers Ibicuí and Quaraí, and to the north of Rio Jaguarão, as set forth in
the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777), and perhaps beyond, through by dismemberment
of Santa Catarina from Brazil. Correlated to that goal, was a project headed by José
Gervasio Artigas to gain sovereignty in the hinterland, encompassing for the provinces
of Entre Rios, Banda Oriental and Missões. On the other hand, the Court of Rio de
Janeiro sought recognition and demarcation of the border line of 1801 that reflected the
reality of occupation and economic exploitation of the region that was already connected
to the core of the center-south of Brazil.
Therefore, the objectives of the war were not merely focussed on the possession
of Cisplatine, but in its geostrategic significance. Cisplatine was the province best
articulated with the sea in the space between the Plata and Jacuí delta, was part of the
great plain between those rivers and shared with Buenos Aires the Plata delta. To further
complicate the situation, the War of Cisplatine was also an offshoot of the civil war
among the provinces of the old Viceroyalty: Montevideo since 1811 had become a center
of opposition to Buenos Aires, and after rise of Artigas and 1821 the Orientals were
divided between the independence or incorporation to the United Provinces or Brazil.
The grand strategy followed by Brazil in the great conflict over the Plata, including
therein the War of Cisplatine, fits broadly in the indirect approach theorized by Liddell
Hart, which is included in the third model of the strategic plan proposed by André Beaufre.
If the margin of freedom of action is narrow and the means limited, and the goal is important, the
decision will be searched through a series of successive actions, combining, according to necessity,
direct threat and indirect pressure with actions with of limited strength. [...] It adapts, in particular,
to the case of nations defensively strong, eager to progressively get great results, engaging reduced
means offensively. (BEAUFRE, 1998, p 33).
The result of applying this strategy did not escape the careful analysis of Carlos
Oneto y Viana, politician and intellectual Uruguayan, who classified the Convention of

9 After the victory of Sucre, Bolívar’s lieutenant, over the Spaniards at Ayacucho (December 8, 1824),
Buenos Aires had to accept the loss of Upper Peru.