Page 210 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

210 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

characteristic of this strategic model in conflicts in South America during the nineteenth
century was limited to an essentially defensive posture.
On the issue of Cisplatine, since the regency of D. Pedro in 1821 and 1822, before
independence, Brazil adopted this strategic model: seeking to maintain relations with the
neighboring provinces, negotiated a treaty with Buenos Aires, rushed to establish diplomatic
relations with Paraguay and signaled through its consul in Buenos Aires, Antonio Manuel
Correia da Câmara, that “Brazil, frank and loyal, will give Montevideo by the just paying
of millions it spent, and when free from anarchy, the provinces cease to jeopardize us”
(CÂMARA, 1822) , performing at the end of 1822 a naval demonstration in the region with
the frigates Union and Carolina and the corvette Liberal. The guidelines issued by José
Bonifácio, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Empire, to the first consul appointed
to Buenos Aires in order to seek an alliance with that government were clear.

The common sense, the politics, the reason it was founded, and the critical situation of America are
telling us, and teaching those who have ears to hear and eyes to see, that a defensive and offensive league of
many States that occupy this vast continent, is necessary for each and every one of them to fully maintain
their freedom and independence deeply threatened by the irritating European claims. (Aleixo, 2012, p 43).
When conflict turned inevitable, Brazil followed the same strategy, seeking in the
ground war the continued occupation of Montevideo and Colonia and the defense of
Rio Grande’s border, while at sea, employing the direct threat, embodied in the naval
blockade of the River Plata.

4. The operational strategy or the operational art
The attitudes of Brazil and the United Provinces in the field of grand strategy would
constrain their operational strategies. The strategy adopted by the Platinos fits in one
of the models of military solution to the strategic game recommended by the Beaufre,
in that they mobilized the Republican Army, concentrated it inside Cisplatine and then
invaded Rio Grande, in order to destroy the Army of the South, betting all on a military
campaign that would culminate in a battle that would decide the conflict.

When there are means and a superior offensive capability sufficiently secured, the campaign will
target the decisive battle offensively. It is the offensive strategy of direct approach, which should
make the maximum concentration of the means, aiming at the main mass of the enemy “(BEAUFRE,
1998, p. 79)
On the other hand the strategic attitude of Brazil did not fit into any classic application
now recognized, which is the source of speculation around a really unique model of
military operations in a framework of political and strategic limitations of freedom
of action and means in which the aim to achieve victory is of paramount importance
to Brazil’s conservation of territory and recognition of its border. Applying the terms
created by Liddell Hart, did not happen an anteposition of the indirect method, the
strategy of battle and maneuver, by the Imperial Army, to the direct method chosen by
the Platinos, the “battle strategy, the Clausewitz’s strategy of one pole and annihilation
“(Hart, 1967, p. 19).
In December 1825 the military situation was defined as a foreign war and in 1826