Page 215 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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was ripped aside at the tactical level of battle, while the enemy seemingly “in retreat”
welled up from behind the opposite hill trying to involve and destroy the two Brazilian
divisions. Around one o’clock, Barbacena decided to withdraw toward Cacequi to go on
the defense.
Passo do Rosário was a battle on the Napoleonic style, influenced by the operational
strategy that was born at that time. After receiving from Bento Manuel, commander of
the 1st Brigade of Light Cavalry, the message dated February 17, in which he stated
that “the enemy wagons today crossed down [15th] through Campo da Cruz between
the marshes of Jacaré and the Cacequi river: it’s certain the withdrawal through São
Simão” (FRAGOSO, 1951, p. 238, emphasis added) - in fact, an act of concealment
by Alvear - everything indicates that Barbacena believed the Republican Army was
inflecting to the west. The Brazilian commander then decided to cross the Santa Maria
River more to the south, in Passo do Rosário, to bar the march of the Republican Army
toward the Uruguay River, across which the enemy seemed to want to withdraw. On
the 19th, seeing that the enemy was also heading toward Passo do Rosário, Barbacena
decided to pursue the fight and the next day adopted a formation of approach which
quickly evolved into an attack formation. In turn, Alvear led the Platinos to the chosen
battlefield under rigorous confidentiality of his intentions: the Republican Army shifted
its positions after arriving at the destination, some troops crossed the river and returned
to the same margin and its bivouac was occupied in a disorderly way, giving the
impression of a hasty implementation of an ongoing crossing river, thereby enhancing
the attractiveness for the Army of the South. Interestingly, the different designations of
the battle assumed by Brazilian and Platinos express their intentions and misconceptions
during these maneuvers. The Brazilians never reached the Passo do Rosário and the
Platinos did not fight in Ituzaingó , actually another river and not the stream Imbaé,
15
currently Imbé, near which the battle took place the day February 20, 1827.
In the best Napoleonic tradition, the destruction of the Army of the South under
General Alvear’s plan would occur according to the concepts of strategic battle:
“involvement, disruption and exploitation” (Chandler, 1966, p. 184). None of this was
consummated. The superiority on the field of the Platino cavalry resulted, at most, in a
whirlwind attack on the baggage trains of the Imperial army, but did not compromise the
formation of the two Brazilian divisions that although separated and unable to operate
together, remained in possession of the land where they were, holding off the cavalry that
harassed them and without any contact or approaching of the enemy infantry. Neither
could have been any exploitation of success where there had been no break, much less a
pursuit, when occurs the exponential casualties by deaths and prisoners, something that
did not happen. When ordered by its commander, the Imperial army withdrew from the
battlefield at an ordinary pace, with the 2nd Division at the rear collecting the wounded
and the scattered cattle and leaving behind only an ingrown artillery piece whose repair

15 Rio Branco, answering questions from Tasso Fragoso about the name given by the Platinos to the Imbaé
stream, explains: “As seen on the map of Cabrer and of the Spanish and Portuguese pathfinders, the name
Ituzaingó belonged to the river that presently is called Ibicuí Armada, on the left bank of the Santa Maria
“(FRAGOSO, 1951, p. 402).