Page 220 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

220 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

River Plate - “perhaps, if such delivery could be fair or opportune, should Brazil give to
Buenos Aires, dominated by internal factions [...] to finish up the fear of the evils that
had we suffered ? “(BRAZIL, 1825). For Brazil, surrender the Cisplatine to Buenos
Aires through diplomatic or military pressure would mean reviving the possibility of
invasion of Rio Grande as had happened in the eighteenth century.
Except in cases of total conflict of the modern era or historical waves of populations
(wolkerwanderung), military solutions hardly overlap the human realities that often
prove extremely resilient. This was the mistake in the grand strategy of Buenos Aires.
With their leaders involved in the political turmoil, which deconstructs government after
government, Buenos Aires could not glimpse the great difficulties for the success of its
ambitious political-military offensive, even with the historical perspective. Even though
the 1827 campaign might have succeeded in destroying the Army of the South and
launching a Republican separatist uprising in the province of Rio Grande, such success
would not have ended the conflict, but would likely given a long, generalized and costly
war in the South towards restoration on Rio Grande.
The best Buenos Aires’s strategic procedure to conserve the Banda Oriental would

have been the enforcement of law and order in its area of influence and guaranteeing the
legitimacy and credibility of a border treaty with Brazil. But that was unthinkable in 1820
and unreachable in 1825. There was a widespread feeling of discontent in certain Platino
circles, particularly about the border in 1801, even though it was constituted a social and
economic reality. In Montevideo was a growing animosity toward continued Brazilian
rule aggravated by the harping voices of émigrés porteños and the annoying presence
of Brazilian-Portuguese troops. There was no proposal or approach from Buenos Aires
about a border treaty with Brazil and the words of that government minister at the court
of Rio de Janeiro in 1823 seemed more like an ultimatum than a proposal to open
negotiations. Finally, the violence in the Platino provinces determined the prevalence of
politically-oriented thinking toward the application of military force.
The conflict was therefore inevitable and only weapons could decide the outcome.
The coming result was predicted by a chronicler and astute merchant the Englishman
John Beaumont who recorded in his work Viajes a Buenos Aires, Entre Rios y la
Banda Oriental (1826-1827) his conviction that the definition of the war was in favor of
the stronger contender. His personal impression reflected the view of the British Foreign
Office that allowed the situation to go forward in this direction and only then interfered
in the matter, seeking influence and power in the region, what, thereby generating a
veiled diplomatic dispute with the government of Rio de Janeiro.

7. Conclusion
The strategies of Cisplatine War examined from the current level of knowledge allow
some conclusions about the merits of indirect strategy as advocated by Liddell Hart and
Beaufre as well by the proponents of the strategy of containment during the Cold War,
particularly, George Kennan.
Today, when the freedom of political and military action is strongly influenced by