Page 217 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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crossing of the Chico-Camacuã River, in full due to heavy rains, on 30 and 31 January,
in an operation that lasted 36 hours, when the enemy was about a league away, but did
not notice what was going on, was, unquestionably, the greatest achievement of Bento
Gonçalves in this campaign.

5. The naval warfare
The naval warfare was the offensive element of Brazil’s strategy of war, through the
declaration of blockade of the Rio de La Plata on December 31, 1825. Buenos Aires
answered with the declaration of a privateer’s war against the Brazilian navigation, that
despite causing considerable damage did not compromise deeply the Brazilian economy
or undercut the war effort in the Cisplatine, being therefore of limited value to the
grand strategy and insufficient for the operational strategy. Comparatively analyzed, the
blockade of the Rio de La Plata and privateering produced results very different in scope
and effectiveness.
The blockade, although it was politically costly to the Empire that suffered intense
pressure from the United States and France, and then from England, to relieve him, even
softened after 1826, continued to ruin the economy of Buenos Aires - that supported the
fight alone - and finally destroyed its naval power in the Battle of Monte Santiago (7 and
April 8, 1827), which combined with the failure of the Alvear’s ground campaign led to
the Rivadavia’s request for peace by, which did not accomplish.
In other hand, the Buenos Aires privateering, although it caused havoc and shock
along the extensive Brazilian coast, driven by ship owners and adventurous Americans
and Europeans, beyond the control of Buenos Aires’ government, eventually degenerated
into piracy, as can be appreciate from the comments of the commander of Brazilian
naval forces in the theater of operations, Admiral Rodrigo Pinto Guedes, Baron of Rio
da Prata, and the Austrian Ambassador Baron Mareschal, about the capture of United
States’ ships by privateers - the ambassador showed curious about the attitude that
country would henceforth (MARESCHAL, 1827) – something that reduced the Buenos
Aires freedom of political maneuver in the conflict.
The Buenos Ayres privateers are already fully in the practice of piracy, no nation can escape them.
The British have been extraordinarily insulted and robbed, but I believe that the government is
satisfying them with the promise of compensations.
The United States begins suffering. The Schooner Hazard claimed by the virtuous Commodore
Biddle, and Secretary of State ordered me to hand over, when I had already set free, was taken by a
Buenos Ayres privateer - Republican Argentino - (GUEDES, 1827).

Although there have been no joint operations of the Imperial Army and Navy, was
clear that their operational strategies were subortinate to Brazil’s grand strategy. In
addition to imposing to the loosening the rules of engagement in the blockade of the
Plata, the government forbade the bombardment of Buenos Aires by the imperial fleet
in 1828. It would have been a powerful psychological blow with which to close the
war, but had the potential to cause difficulties in the process for the peace negotiations
conducted by the Empire at the start of that year.
During the war, the Imperial Navy sank, burned and captured a large number of