Page 214 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

214 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

I inform to your Excellency that on the army leaving, in the early morning of February 20, the ranch
of Antônio Francisco, in order to harass and impede the enemy do its withdrawal through the Passo
do Rosário, we find him, at 6 am, a league before the Passo, in very advantageous position, and
showing intent to impede the march of our army, even though the army was partly ready for this
meeting, it did not expect, however, gathered all its forces on this side of the river. (Ibid., p. 410)
At this point in the narrative, is best to ignore the advice of Barbara Tuchman
(Practicing History) about the inconvenience of discussing the evidence in front of
readers. It is important to broaden the assessment of the question of the intentions of the
commanders before that battle, something that is always difficult, even at the present
stage of evolution of military doctrine, which, presents its difficulties with regard to the
direct commander, certainly others, indeed greater when it comes to the commander
who is on the other side of the hill.
The statements of the Brazilian officers about the platino’s formation before the
battle coincide in two points: 1) the positions occupied by Platinos were advantageous,
i.e., dominated the area in front of them; 2) the Republican Army troops were arranged
in two lines, with reserves, arrayed in broad formation able to perform the double
envelopment of the Brazilian force. Well, it is very difficult to accept that this position
and this formation have been chosen, recognized and decided on the afternoon of the eve
of battle, even if one takes into account that the Republican Army, after reaching that day
of destiny in Passo do Rosário, made several movements, crossed and recrossed the river
with some troops and then changed the place of its bivouac and combat trains.
The record indicates that the commander of the Republican Army proceeded in his
planned deception, after having lured his opponent to the chosen region, seeking to give the
idea that his force was in confusion. As seen, the plan worked, and the Army of the South
rashly dived into a clash combat, a theory held by some historians for a long time about the
battle. That may be true for the Brazilians, who quickly developed themselves and attacked,
but not for the Platinos, who, until that moment, followed their operational plan.
The battle lasted about six hours. The two Brazilian divisions adopted the attack
formation, with the second, under the General Callado, at left, with a small vanguard
in front of it commanded by General José de Abreu, and the first, under the General
Barreto, at right. The first division attacked the Platino position, repelling the advanced
line of enemy snipers, almost at the same time that the 2nd Division received a charge
from the Lavalleja division which brought in confusion the men of Abreu. The Callado
division, nucleated in the 13th and 18th Battalions (“Batalhões de Caçadores” or BC),
among whom were northeastern veterans of the War of Independence, formed squares
and repelled all the cavalry charges made against them. On the right flank, the first
division of General Barreto, with the 27th BC ahead - a unit what was trained in Rio de
Janeiro personally by the Emperor and composed by German mercenaries - and the 3rd
and 4th BC, and cavalry with this division, moved to attack, crossing the small stream
that divided the battlefield and repelling all counter-attacks from enemy cavalry. Further
to the right, the 2nd Light Cavalry Brigade, under Bento Gonçalves, was outnumbered
by Platino cavalry and was forced off the battlefield. In front of Barbacena, the strategic
veil with which Alvear concealed his intentions in previous weeks using zigzag marches