Page 211 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
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          Brazil  concentrated  an army on the frontier, and in the following  year campaigned
          further back, thereby maintaining the frontier until the end of the war. A strategy of
          battle  and maneuver  by The Army of the South, or the imperial  forces as a whole,
          advised an attack on the concentration of the Republican Army, inside the Cisplatine, or,
          in a broader context, invading Entre Rios and  converging on Buenos Aires. Proposals

          to this effect made  by operational commanders on the ground to the upper echelons of
          the government were flatly refused and the Army of the South, through the critical 1827
          campaign - during which it attacked an numerically superior force at a place chosen
          by the enemy - abided to a territorial strategy that combined defensive and offensive
          operations, over which the government exercised constant control   (PICTURE 3).
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             The political situation of the United Provinces did not impose many limitations on them.
          Rather, the precariousness of government institutions, the civil war among the provinces
          and the dissolution of the authority of Buenos Aires over parts of the old Viceroyalty
          impelled porteño leaders to pursue bold initiatives, without much concern for discretion.
          They sought support in the United States and England , and sought Simon Bolivar’s
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          diplomatic and military support  for the war against Brazil. Militarily, the effort of the
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          United Provinces was devoted to a ground campaign to destroy the Army of the South.
             The  Republican Army’s campaign  for  1827  began  in  the  last  days  of  1826  with
          the invasion of the Rio Grande aimed at Army of the South. Initially, the Republican
          commander, General Alvear, sought to beat separately the two parts of the Imperial
          Army in Santana do Livramento and Pelotas, but failed (PICTURE 4). This phase, which
          lasted until the beginning of February ended with the strategic success of the Brazilian
          commander, General Felisberto Pontes Caldeira Brandt, Marquis of Barbacena, who
          managed to maneuver near Bagé the junction of the main part of his army with the
          division under the command of Marshal Brown which marched from Pelotas.
             In the second phase of the campaign,  the commander  of the Republican  Army

          10  In the letter dated October 20, 1826, which answers to the memorandum of October 2 of Barbacena in
             which the newly appointed commander of the Army of the South proposed a plan to the Emperor of
             offensive war in the South, the Conde de Lages, Minister of War Empire , asks if the occupation of the
             province of Entre Rios, proposed by Barbacena, there should be the policy of the empire in relation to
             the neighboring republics. Similarly, although at operational level and not political, it is observed in the
             extensive correspondence throughout the year 1826 by the commander of the Southern Army, General
             Rosado, the emphasis that determines Bento Manuel to remain on the defensive with his Light Cavalry
             Brigade in Quaraí, preventing to do “Quixotadas, give up what little we have to abandon it across the
             border to the Ocean” (CIDADE, 1931, p.52).
          11   .... General Tomas Iriarte counts in his “Memoirs” that having (Rivadavia) appointed Alvear as
             representative to the U.S. government, he ordered him to do a detour through London before arriving at
             his destination and that the object of this detour was to instruct Canning, the minister of Foreign Affairs,
             about the glassy (“vitrioso”) state of relations between the two countries. (MORENO, 1961, p. 32)
          12  In this instance of the Oriental question, the governor of Buenos Aires Juan Gregorio de Las Heras
             - temporarily entrusted of the Executive Branch due to the Basic Law of January 23, 1825 -, and his
             Foreign Minister, Manuel José Garcia, had appointed Carlos María de Alvear and José Miguel Díaz
             Vélez ministers plenipotentiary to Simon Bolivar in Upper Peru, according to the instructions dated
             June 10, 1825. The fundamental purposes of the embassy were negotiate with Bolivar an alliance with
             the United Provinces to regain sovereignty in the Banda Oriental, and parley for that the Alto Peru had
             representation in Congress in Buenos Aires. (BRONDO, 2011, p. 21-22)
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