Page 213 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
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213
          ActA
                   PICTURE 4
             Strategic marches
             that preceded the
             Battle of Passo do
            Rosário. Guerra da
            Cisplatine, marchas
              estratégicas que
                precederam a
           batalha do passo do
           Rosário. In História
                 do Exército
                Brasileiro de
              Estado-Maior do
             Exército. Brasília:
            Serviço Geográfico
              do IBGE, 1972,
                     p. 533.











          which extended to the entire province of Rio Grande, due to the worsening of the enemy
          invasion in São Gabriel. Pressed by these political and psychological circumstances,
          the Marquis of Barbacena had no alternative but to “chase” an enemy that actually had
          leeway to choose the place and time to fight the battle that would decide the campaign.
             What is remarkable in Barbacena’s decision to seek combat under uncertain conditions
          was his determination,  and that  of the subordinate  commanders  and their  troops to
          engage, despite the mistrust born on the eve of the battle, the 19th, when they spotted
          the entire enemy army converging on the Passo do Rosario. Since the beginning of the
          campaign, guided by its territorial strategy, the Brazilian army had not seen itself as the
          enemy’s goal. At the council of war on the evening of February 19, the commanders
          feared they might be falling into a trap, but they decided to accept the risk and confront
          the enemy.
                Barbacena still on the 19 convened a war council of generals and brigade commanders. Were all of
                the opinion that it should attack the enemy anywhere and provision that it was found (FRAGOSO,
                1951, p. 241)
              The next day this determination was confirmed when the Army of the South marched
          towards the Passo do Rosário - where he knew the enemy had camped overnight - and,
          finding  him  a  league  ahead  of  Passo,  wasted  no  time  in  developing  the  troop  from
          the marching column to adopt the tactical scheme of attack that was triggered after

          examination of the situation made  by the Marquis of Barbacena and his Chief of Staff,
          General Brown, whose combat report reveals the intention of the command of the Army
          of the South.
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