Page 236 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
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236                                XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

           idea of a broader war against Russia.  There was not any difficulty in finding new allies
           for such a war. The Piedmont-Sardinian Kingdom, which was the only Italian state that
           had freed itself from the political supervision of Austria, signed a military treaty with
           France and Britain (Treaty of Turin - January 26, 1855). In compliance with the treaty,
                                                                                      28*
           15 thousand troops under the command of the Italian general Alfonso La Marmora
           set out to join the British in Crimea. As for the Prime Minister of Piedmont, Camillo
           Cavour, the dispatch of this expeditionary force was an opportunity to strengthen an
           alliance with the Western powers aiming to support the case of the Italian Unification
           under the leadership of Piedmont. Therefore, he supported the idea of a general war
           against Russia. In the words of a French general watching their disembarkation from the
           ship in Balaklava, they were all “well-educated, organized, disciplined, and vigorous in
                                                29
           their new and bright navy blue uniforms”.
              When the calendar  showed the spring of 1855, the Allies were discussing about
           where the new assaults needed to be directed. Many British people hoped to benefit
           from an operation in the Caucasus, where the local Muslim tribes under the command
           of Sheikh Shamil had contacted with the Turkish army to attack on Russians in Georgia
           and Circassia. Being reluctant  to send their troops to Caucasia and refraining from
           depending on Muslim units, the Allies could in fact deal a faster and more destructive
           blow to Russia in Caucasia than the one caused by the eleven-month siege of Sevastopol.
                                                                  30
           But they were too cautious to take advantage of this potential.
              In the mid-June of 1855, the Russians advanced towards Kars and entered into direct
           clash with the Ottomans. The Turks had to defend Kars without taking any help. A
           general attack was also started in Crimea towards the end of August. 31
              Comprehending that Sevastopol could no longer resist the siege, the Tsar ordered
           General Gorchakov to make a last attempt towards the allied units. According to the
           Tsar, they needed a military success in order to sit at the table of peace negotiations
           with an upper hand. For the Russians, who started an assault on August 16, the defeat
           of Cerneya [Tchernaïa] was a disaster. Gorchakov ordered that the whole southern side
           of Sevastopol should be evacuated. Military facilities were blown up and depots were
           set on fire. Crowds of military and civilian people prepared to get across the northern
           coast along the floating bridge. There were a considerable number of Russian soldiers
           believing that the decision for the evacuation of the city was a treachery. Many mariners
           did not want to leave  Sevastopol, where they had spent their  lives. The evacuation
           activity that had started in the evening lasted until the daylight; and the last group of
           soldiers, before their departure, fired the remaining cannons and sank the last ships of
           the Black Sea fleet that were left in the harbor. 32
              Having been defended by 80.000 troops, Sevastopol was beaten by the allied land

           28  For the document stating that Sardinia would join the alliance of Britain, France and the Ottoman State with
              a strength of fifteen thousand troops, see BOA, İrade Hariciye, (İ.HR), 5672, 8 March 1855.
           29   Orlando Figes, pp. 344-345.
           30   Orlando Figes, pp. 345-353.
           31   Stanford Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye, E Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1977, pp. 178-180.
           32  Orlando Figes, pp. 390-394.
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