Page 234 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
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234                                XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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           operation, of which the transfer activities were completed on September 18.  The British
           used 52 sailboats, 27 steam transports and a few warships carrying 22.000 infantrymen,
           1.000 cavalrymen, 3.000 engineers and 60 field cannons. Besides, the French sent 25.000
           infantrymen (most of whom were Algerians), 2.800 engineers and 68 field cannons by
           200 small ships in addition to the warships. It was the biggest ‘amphibious operation’
           conducted until then.
              In the fall of 1854, the European allies encountered for the first time after 40 years
           on that battlefield, which was unfamiliar for them. Lack of coordination with the navy
           including 6 Ottoman warships, and the discord among the officers responsible for the
           land operations were the clear characteristics of the first days of the campaign. 18
              As a result of the reconnaissance activities on the coasts between Gozleve and
           Sevastopol, the Eskikale (old castle) region located between the mouth of Alma stream
           and Gozleve was determined as the landing area. The landing operation of the British,
           French and Turkish forces began on September 14, 1854, and ended on September 17.
           The allied land troops reached the north of the Sevastopol port on September 26. When
           it was understood in the reconnaissance activity that Sevastopol was not possible to be
           attacked from north, it was decided to direct the troops to the south of the port and to
           benefit from the support of the naval forces. In the meantime, the Russians reinforced
           the Malakoff bastion that was at an important position in Sevastopol; what’s more, they
           closed the entrance to the Sevastopol port. The first real bombardment started on October
           17; a severe fight took place between 1.200 guns of the allies and 116 guns of the Russians.
              During this bombardment in which more than 700 tons of shells were used, the French
           kept all their vessels together, and thus did not let any one of them be exposed to much
           fire than the others. However, the British kept some of their fleet apart, which brought
           great harm to the ships. Despite the inexperience of the Russian artillerymen, this sea-
           land artillery combat ended in favor of the Russians. Following this bombardment would
           come the battle of Balaklava, which started with the Russian offensive on November 25
           and ended in the withdrawal of the allies.
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              Balaklava  was important  as a  strategic  position.  In case the  Russians had  taken
           control of Balaklava, the British could not have been able to use the harbor anymore and
           could not have continued to besiege Sevastopol from north for long; thus the Russians
           could have found way to aid Sevastopol. The Russians first attacked the bastions, and
           succeeded in removing the British and Ottoman forces defending those bastions.  The
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           Turks defending the Canrobert hill resisted the Russians for more than an hour, where
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           half of them were killed.  While the Russian cavalry were about to enter Balaklava,

           17  1853-1856 Kırım Harbi’nde 3ncü Ordu, 3rd Army Command Publications, February 1991, Erzincan.
           18   Virginia  H. Aksan,  Kuşatılmış  Bir  İmparatorluk  Osmanlı  Harpleri  1700-1870,  translated  by  Gül  Çağalı
              Güven, Türkiye İs Bankasi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2010, pp. 484-488.
           19   1853-1856 Osmanlı-Rus ve Kırım Savaşı Deniz Harekatı, Gnkur. Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Yayinlari, Ankara,
              1977, pp.70-75.
           20   Fuat Andıç-Süphan Andıç, Kırım Savaşı Âli Paşa ve Paris Antlaşması, Eren Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2002, p.35.
           21   Alan Palmer, 1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı ve Modern Avrupa’nın Doğuşu, translated by Meral Gaspıralı, Sabah
              Kitaplari, Istanbul, 1987, p.123.
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