Page 303 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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most evident choice, for it had taken part in the campaign against Serbia and its units
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were already in place in Serbia and at the border with Montenegro. The 3 Army, how-
ever, was still under the control of Mackensen’s army group, so that any further planning
had to be coordinated with the German ally. The German Chief of Staff General von
Falkenhayn, however, was focusing his military attention on the German Western front
(Verdun), and also regarded the allied threat from the so-called “Sarrail Army” stationed
near Salonika as significant, so that he was unwilling to dispatch any troops for the of-
fensive against Montenegro and Albania. In further consequence, the diverging opinions
of the two allied army commands as to their military focus for 1916 caused serious ir-
ritations which eventually led to a rupture between the two commanders, when Austro-
Hungarian Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf declared the military convention
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for the conquest of Serbia signed on 6 September 1915 null and void, and placed the 3
Army under the direct command of the Imperial and Royal Army High Command. It is
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quite obvious that Conrad’s actions aimed at underlining not only the significance of the
Austro-Hungarian war theatres to the German allies, in this particular case the Western
Balkans, but also to an equal extent the independence of his own military planning and
operations.
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Immediately after the separation of the Imperial and Royal 3 Army on 20 December
1915, preparations began for the offensive against Montenegro. The time factor played
an important role, since the units designated for the operation were planned for another
campaign, scheduled to start as early as March/April 1916. According to the chain of
command, all troops stationed at the West border of Montenegro were to be placed un-
der the “Commanding General in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia (BHD)” Stephan
Sarkotic. The XIX corps under Lieutenant Field Marshal Ignaz Trollman was to lead the
decisive operation against the Lovcen massif, and several operative groups consisting of
divisions and brigades, as well as the mobile units of the naval base, were placed under
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his command.
Apart from the main thrust against the Lovcen, the operational plan also provided
for movements at the Northern and Western border of Montenegro, to prevent any shift-
ing of Montenegrin units into the Lovcen area. The main thrust in the attack area was
to be delivered by some 25 infantry battalions, with another five battalions standing by
as operational reserve. Based on the assessment of the XIX corps, this was to achieve
an infantry superiority of approximately two to one. Despite this significant concentra-
tion of infantry, the success of the operation seemed far from guaranteed. Especially the
French and Russian-made Montenegrin defence batteries in tunnelled and well-hidden
positions, in conjunction with equally covered machinegun positions presented the at-
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tackers with a defence force to be seriously reckoned with. The 3 Army Command had
been aware of this difficulty beforehand, and had promised to assign substantial artillery

2 Cramon August von, Unser österreichisch-ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkriege. Erinnerungen aus mei-
ner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtigter General beim k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando, Berlin 1920, p.45
3 ÖSTA/KA NFA 3. Armee, Op.No. 8058