Page 300 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

300 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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was the 4 (Preslav) division, whose commander, General Kiselov, was also appointed
commanding general of the advancing troops. Fourth (Preslav) division consisted of
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two infantry brigades and 4 Artillery Brigade (5 and 15 Artillery Regiments), twelve
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batteries of 4 guns each. The division was reinforced with two artillery battalions (16
guns) from 3 Howitzer Artillery Regiment. One brigade from 1 (Sofia) Division also
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participated in the assault, with 4 Artillery Regiment (24 guns) and a howitzer battalion
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from 1 Howitzer Artillery Regiment. In order to reinforce the assault with heavy artil-
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lery, 2 Heavy Artillery Regiment was added, consisting of two 12 cm and three 15 cm
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slow-shooting, and two 15 cm fast-shooting batteries. Bulgarian forces consisted of 32
infantry battalions, 34 batteries, 4 squadrons, and 1 engineer battalion, totaling 55,000
soldiers, 132 guns, and 53 machine-guns. The plan called for a fast, surprising blow in
the center of the defense, aiming at piercing the front line and seizure of the fort. The
main mission of the heavy group was to suppress the Romanian artillery. The field artil-
lery would accompany the infantry, supporting it as it went.
After a 45-minute artillery bombardment the artillery achieved the expected results:
the enemy artillery was almost silent and the Rumanian infantry was so shaken it re-
treated from the first trench line. At 08.10 the Bulgarian infantry started their attack, and
the field artillery advanced behind. Two hours later fort 6 fell. By 11.30 forts 5, 7, and 8
also fell, and the field artillery changed its positions. 4
Despite some weaknesses, cooperation between infantry and artillery was good, and
ensured seizure of the fortress in only 36 hours. Time shortage pressure prevented com-
plete reconnaissance, the reason the attack was postponed for one day, a judgment that
should be assessed as correct.

The Macedonian Front
From December 1915 until the end of the war, at Dojran and at the Bulgarian-Greek
border area both sides entrenched, defending with only limited attacks. As little ground
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changed hands both sides took the opportunity to prepare thorough defenses. The activi-
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ties of the artillery west of Dojran, in the sector of the 9 (Pleven) Division, were inter-
esting, and worth discussion and study. This division fought defensive battles from the
beginning of 1917 to the autumn of 1918. At times the division held a vast front – from
the Vardar River to Dojran – but in 1918 its sector was narrowed to 14 km. Commanded
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by General Vladimir Vazov, the 9 Infantry Division (arguably Bulgaria’s best), together
with the artillery, organized a solid defense. That is why, despite repeated attempts by
far stronger forces, the enemy was not successful in piercing the defense. The artillery
played important role in the stubbornness of the defense.
The battery positions were very carefully chosen and considered the nature of the
artillery (gun or howitzer) and the missions that were required. All batteries were ef-
fectively hidden from direct observation. Artillery reconnaissance and observation were

4 Anguelov, A. ibid., p. 45, 46.
5 Alan Wakefield and Simon Moody Under the Devil’s eye : the British military experience in Macedonia,
1915-18 (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2011) is a modern if Anglo-centric history of the
campaign.