Page 304 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

304 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

support to the XIX corps. 4
Despite the considerable reinforcement of the troops in the Lovcen area, however,
the operational plans of the XIX corps were based on the assumption that a frontal
assault on the massif would be either impossible or would involve heavy casualties.
Lieutenant Field Marshal Trollmann thus opted for an attack from the Southern Lovcen
plateau and the Krstac pass in the North, so as to build up a two-sided threat to the flanks
of the Lovcen defence. Once the onslaught began, this approach was to prove efficient
and kept losses at bay. Nevertheless, eliminating the defence artillery in the Cattaro area
remained the most important condition for the success of the operation. It was precisely
here, however, that the first difficulties already began to emerge. The offensive artillery
was divided into three tactical groups, comprising field-gun and howitzer batteries, as
well as two heavy 42cm and 24cm batteries. These, of course, required the correspond-
ing deployment space, which should be outside the enemy’s field of view, but at the
same time ought to have the necessary infrastructure of streets and paths to transport
ordnance and to secure ammunition supplies. Eventually, the choice was narrowed down
to the Traste, Vermac and Orahovac areas. To build up artillery superiority despite these
limitations, Imperial and Royal War Navy units were also assigned to the XIX corps;
though they consisted of several older ships, their weaponry of 12-24 cm guns and their
independence from external resupply and deployment space presented a significant rein-
forcement. In addition, Army and Navy aircraft, observation balloons, and searchlights
5
were provided for artillery observation and reconnaissance. The air force, which also
included German army aviators, was to play a particular role in the reconnaissance of
enemy positions and in updating the artillery’s target coordinates.
Especially the infantry and artillery offensive was met with considerable difficulties
in the first days of January 1916. The geographical conditions were dominated by path-
less karst, which was, on top of that, particularly arid. In early 1916, the light railway
rails already under construction in Herzegovina and in the Cattaro district were not yet
operational. As a result, wagons had to be used for transport, which in turn depended on
passable routes. Very often the last kilometres to the deployment areas had to be covered
with pack animals. The consequence of such intensive utilization of wagons and pack
animals, however, was that a large part of the load capacity had to be used to supply the
pack animals themselves – since winter weather conditions meant that no soilage was
available on site. The result was a continuous undersupply of the troops in the deploy-
ment areas, and a great part of the winter protection equipment and other supply goods
failed to reach the troops in time before the launch of the offensive. 6

The Montenegrin Army had already suffered heavy losses in the 1914 and 1915 cam-
rd
paigns, which could only be compensated with troops from the 3 draft. The already

4 Enne Peter, Die österreichisch-ungarische Offensive gegen Montenegro 1916 unter besonderer Berücksich-
tigung der Operation über den Lovcen und des Zusammenbruchs der montenegrinischen Armee, Diploma
thesis at the University of Vienna, Vienna 2008, p.81 f.
5 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, volume IV, p.47
6 ÖSTA/KA/NFA 3. Armee Op.No. 8249