Page 305 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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militia-like structure of the Montenegrin forces was hardly compromised by this. The
adverse living conditions in the remote, hardly accessible areas of Montenegro had pro-
duced independent, very courageous, duty-bound soldiers, whose sometimes very close
kinship relations within their companies and battalions fostered a strong camaraderie in
the lowest ranks. In contrast, their operating leadership proved to be quite inefficient,
especially since, on the one hand, it suffered from a lack of expert staff and, on the other,
company and battalion commanders operated very autonomously. Unauthorized deci-
sions to withdraw or attack were a daily occurrence, and – in conjunction with other acts
of ill-discipline – would thwart their perseverance and willingness to make sacrifices in
other sectors of the front. The core of the Montenegrin defences in the Cattaro area con-
sisted in particular of the well hidden and tunnelled cannons and machine-guns, which
could unleash concentric fire on any assailant. The few paths passable by infantry were
also observed by enemy infantry, stationed in equally fortified positions. In addition to
the Montenegrin units, the lines of the defenders included several Serbian soldiers from
disintegrated units, to whom one could still attribute a certain combat value despite the
lack of resupplies and a crippled morale. It was, however, precisely the large number of
deserters caught by Austro-Hungarian forward posts in the first days of January 1916
that allowed for a relatively clear overview of the situation. Moreover, aerial observation
revealed that the enemy had detected the preparations for the offensive and had already
introduced reinforcement measures. On the other hand, the accounts of the deserters
made it clear that the catastrophic supply situation was already having a negative impact
on the morale and perseverance of the defenders. 7
Since the 3 Army command had requested the earliest possible onset of the offen-
rd
sive, but the general deployment had been halted and supply lines had to be installed, the
launch of the offensive was scheduled for January 4. The offensive, however, would also
have to wait for clear weather that would allow for efficient artillery monitoring, since a
precise artillery impact was deemed essential for the attack on the Lovcen. 8
In the end, the attack began on January 7, 1916 in the area of the northern group to
create the necessary conditions for an advance in the middle section. In the early morn-
ing of January 8, the offensive artillery suddenly began its preparatory bombardment of
the enemy positions. Apart from the heavy siege artillery, the heavy guns from the units
of the Imperial and Royal War Navy combined in the V Naval Division delivered a de-
cisive blow to the Montenegrin defenders. Yet the use of naval artillery had had a series
of issues to tackle. In some cases, the elevation ranges of the naval guns were not high
enough to fire on the enemy positions, so that the ships had to be brought into a tilted
position by letting in water ballast on the one side, so as to increase the elevation angle.
A special firing system had to be devised to take hidden, i.e. invisible enemy positions
under indirect fire. Through exact homing of the targets, which had been previously
transferred with precision onto a special map created from aerial photos, and by using
exact calculations of the azimuth and elevation ranges, the navy had compiled so-called
“firing points” on a previously calculated course. When covering such a firing point, the

7 ÖSTA/KA NFA 3. Armee, Kommand. General BHD 1916, OpNo. 165
8 ÖSTA/KA NFA XIX. Korps OpNo. 643/9 1915