Page 331 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
Harington also underlined that it was very difficult or even impossible to discuss
the destruction of other ports than Calais and Boulogne with the French. However, by
mid-July Brigadier-General Ingram from Haig’s headquarters reported that BEF had
asked Foch to list the responsible French authorities in several ports and for permission
to carry out reconnaissance there. This had actually been accepted by the headquarters
of the Allied Supreme Commander, and Foch had made clear that it was the most senior
British officer from the either army or the navy who co-ordinated with the French if the
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execution of the demolition was ordered.
In July the last phase of Ludendorff’s offensive stalled and was met by a successful
counterattack. During the next couple of months Allied offensives broke the back of
the German army. During those weeks Gibb just maintained his plan and preparations.
On 31 August Pound and Fremantle decided that two of Gibb’s demolition units should
remain available until the end October. However, after consultation with Gibb and on
Pound’s recommendation Fremantle decided on 17 October to disband the F.P. Force.
Its army personnel could be released. 3½ weeks later the fighting stopped. The French
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Channel port infrastructure survived.

The engineer’s management and the reality of tactical command in war
Gibb had succeeded in one ambition. On 12 July 1918 ”The London Gazette” an-
nounced that on 4 July the temporary Lieutenant-Colonel, Royal Engineers, Alexander
Gibb , had been given the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, Royal Marines.
29
There is no doubt that Gibb was an excellent civil engineer and project manager.
However, in his arrogance or ambition he seemed unwilling or incapable of understand-
ing that the implementation of a massive and complex destruction just in front of an
enemy force that has broken through the front lines required local and effective unity of
command of both the fighting units and the various demolition teams. The commander
had to combine delaying the enemy advance, hopefully saving most of his force, with
the execution of the demolitions in time. He had to achieve this in a situation that was
likely to be fundamentally chaotic. When Wemyss wrote Henry Wilson on 30 March, he
proved that he understood this, probably as a result of his personal experience at Gal-
lipoli. Gibb did not have the ability or humility to learn to learn this, and Hope probably
did not have the knowledge or will-power to educate him, thereby risking problems with
the powerful Geddes.

27 Ibid.: D.O.D. (H) hand written notes “Destruction of French Ports” from early June; Gibb, Secret to Deputy
First Sea Lord af 10-6-1918; Harington (sign.), Secret, . 43 (M.O.1) til Deputy First Sea Lord of 13-6-1918;
R. Ingram, No. O.B./2221, Very Secret to Chief of the Imperial General Staff ofaf 16-7-1918; Weygand (for
Foch) No. 2079/B to Monsieur le Général de Cane (the British chief liaison officer) of 13-7-1918.
28 See ”Mobilisation Orders of the Commander, F.P. Force, June 1918; D.O.D. (H) for D.C.N.S. to 2 Sea
nd
Lord of 31-8-1918; Memorandum, Naval Staff, “F.P.Scheme” of 15-10-1918; Gibb, Secret, O.P. 0151/- to
D.C.N.S. of 16-10-1918.
29 The London Gazette, 12 July, 1918.