Page 328 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

328 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

the co-ordination meeting, on 30 May, the French authorised the demolition of the port
18
if necessary, and four days later London was informed. During the contact with the
French that was decisive for any implementation of the project, Gibb was invisible, leav-
ing everything to his professional deputy, James, and to Admiral Hope.
Eleven days after the start of GEORGETTE the Allied situation in Flanders had be-
come critical, and on 21 April Henry Wilson informed the War Cabinet by a memoran-
dum that the Allies had considered the evacuation and destruction of Dunkerque a real
possibility. The demolition had been prepared by the Admiralty. Haig had the British
authority to execute, but Foch had informed the BEF commander that he had to wait
for the French government’s approval. Wilson discretely encouraged his government to
influence its Allied colleagues to give Haig the necessary authority. Wemyss had made
clear that it was essential that the Germans did not capture the harbour intact for imme-
19
diate employment against the cross-Channel communications. When the War Cabinet
discussed the Channel ports on 30 April the Secretary for War made clear that the lat-
est German offensive was directed at these ports to capture Calais for use as a U-boat
base. Henry Wilson agreed. He had intelligence that the Germans had sent eighteen
20
trainloads of pontoons to the front, probably to cross the inundations around the ports.
The fact that Keyes’ raid Zeebrugge on 23 April had limited the U-boats’ access to their
existing bases may have been seen as one more German reason to intensify the efforts
to get more suitable alternatives. The War Cabinet could not know that Ludendorff had
decided to end GEORGETTE the day before the meeting, on 29 April. The same lack of
information ruled at the Supreme War Council meeting in Abbeville on 2 May. Outside
the formal agenda the Allied leaders decided that the British Army in France would
withdraw west in case of a German break-through. It was the alternative that Henry
Wilson as well as Winston Churchill had argued was the only sound one. Wemyss’ ef-
21
forts during the previous two weeks had been in vain. Keeping a united front was more
important that a worsening U-boat crisis.

From late May 1918 onwards
Until the Germans launched third phase of the spring offensive against the French on
27 May, the Allies could not be certain that Ludendorff had shifted his attention away
from Flanders. It was therefore logical that Gibb continued to adjust his plan and prepa-
rations. With the Supreme War Council decision in Abbeville his force should be able to
solve the problem even if the allied armies withdrew far west. On 5 May he informed

18 Ibid.: Le General FOCH, General en Chef des Armees Alliees en France, Q.G., 18-4-1918 til Monsieur le
Marechal Commandant en Chef les Forces Britanniques en France; F.P.21. (M.O.1) for D.C.I.G.S to Deputy
First Sea Lord of 23-4-1918; Deputy First Sea Lord, Secret, to D.C.I.G.S. of 23-4-1918; Le General FOCH,
General en Chef des Armees Alliees en France, Q.G.,30-4-1918 to Monsieur le Marechal Commandant en
Chef les Forces Britanniques en France; General Headquarters, British Armies in France, O.B./2221 to Chief
of the Imperial General Staff of 4-5-1918.
19 Ibid.: Henry Wilson, General Staff, War Office, F.P. 20. Secret and Pressing, to Secretary, War Cabinet of
21-4-1918.
20 TNA, CAB 23/6, War Cabinet, 401, agenda item ”The Channel Ports”, 30-4-1918.
21 Lord Hankey: Supreme Command 1914-1918, Volume 2. (London 1961), pp. 796-797.