Page 325 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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Gibb had his plan supplement ready on that day, 15 April. The Dunkerque ad hoc unit
had been named:”No. 12 detachment”. If he, Admiral Colville and Captain Skipwith
kept each other informed, a co-ordinated launch could take place with six hours’ notice,
with trains were ready to start the transport from Southwick to Portsmouth. The only
remaining requirement, Colville’s part, was to make the transports from Portsmouth to
Dunkerque ready. On 18 April Gibb’s deputy, Lieutenant Colonel R. H. James, sent the
Dunkerque unit instruction to its commander, Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Ker. Both were
army engineer officers. The instruction was sent for information to Lynden-Bell, Hope,
Colville, Keyes and the Dover Patrol commander’s senior representative in Dunkerque,
Commodore Hubert Lynes. The instruction made clear that Ker was responsible to
Gibb, not to the army base commandant, for the execution of the demolition. However,
when arriving in Dunkerque he should report to that base commandant to request ac-
commodation, provisions and transport. No demolition could take place before Ker had
received authority from both the BEF Headquarters and the French port “Governor”.
Ker would only order the destruction on orders from the army base commandant if
there was an imminent risk that the harbour would fall into German hands. Apparently
Gibb had finally been informed about Fuller’s preparations, because Ker was to contact
Lynes to make sure that his work did not interfere with efforts to sink block ships in the
harbour. It was clear from the instruction that Gibb would stay in his Admiralty office
during a Dunkerque demolition.
Hope asked Lynden-Bell for comments to the planned project. 19 April the general
noted that Gibbs force headquarters seemed unnecessarily large. And the navy had sug-
gested on 17 April that Gibb would be given the temporary rank as Brigadier General.
Bell considered the rank of colonel sufficient for the task as Gibb worked from the
Admiralty. If there were naval reasons for giving the engineer a higher rank, the Royal
Navy had to give him that higher rank itself. 15
After having handled the immediate need at Dunkirk, Gibb developed his planned
force to include demolition units for both the eleven southern and the four northern ports.
On 18 April Wemyss felt that he had to react to information from Wilson about the
latter’s view of the situation in France. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff had made
crystal clear that in case of a German breakthrough the army favoured a withdrawal
together with the French towards the Somme and even to the Seine. The alternative, a
withdrawal into a bridgehead in the north around the Flanders ports, was not acceptable.
The bridgehead would be too shallow and the forces here would eventually be forced
to surrender. On the same day Winston Churchill, the Minister of Munitions, supported
his old friend Wilson’s analysis in a memorandum to the War Cabinet written with his
usual clear pen.
As already made clear by Fuller in his 12 April memorandum, such an army with-
drawal west would undermine the entire Allied anti-U-boat strategy. Therefore Wemyss

15 Ibid.: P.P.13 (M.O.1.) Secret D.C.I.G.S. to Deputy First Sea Lord of 15-4-1918; F.P.12 (M.O.1.) Very Secret
to Director of Military Operations at General Headquarters, France; Gibb, Secret, D.O.P 0151 to Deputy First
Sea Lord of 15-4-1918; Deputy First Sea Lord, Admiralty, S.W.1 ., to D.C.I.G.S. of 18-4-1918; Lynden-Bell
(sign.), D.C.I.G.S. P.17., Secret to Deputy First Sea Lord of 19-4-1918.