Page 323 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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light from the French authorities if time permitted, he took no initiatives to approach the
ally whose ports he planned to destroy.
Gibb noted that the plan in the present form was ready for execution from 10 April
onwards, if Hope and Whigham then had given their approval and C-in-C Portsmouth
had his sea transport plan ready. Pease immediately forwarded the plan to Hope for ap-
proval and suggested that Gibb went to Portsmouth for co-ordination with Admiral Col-
ville. Thereafter the engineer should inspect the practical progress of the preparations. 11

The real and present danger of Operation GEORGETTE
On 9 April the threat shifted away from the Somme with the next place of the Ger-
man offensive, GEORGETTE. The weak Portuguese army corps partly collapsed, and
as Studd had predicted in December, the offensive threatened the French Dover Straits
ports directly.
Captain Fuller reacted by analysing the consequences and options in a new memo-
randum from 12 April. He underlined that a German breakthrough should not only trig-
ger the prepared sinking of block ships and destruction of all four Flanders ports. Now
both Boulogne and Nieuport had been included. If the army lost control of the coast
and moved back behind the Somme, the U-boats would be able to bypass Keyes’ Dover
Strait barrier and patrol. Dover port would be exposed to long range artillery bombard-
ment and it would be necessary to move the mine barrier west to the line Royal Sover-
eign to Treport. If the Admiralty chose that option, Fuller would develop a detailed plan.
The new barrier would initially require an estimated 10.000 mines. Later that number
would have to be doubled. It should block U-boat passage and thereby help protecting
the Allied traffic to London and Havre, at if possible also to Dieppe. Keyes’ Dover Patrol
would have to be reinforced and bomber aircraft deployed to attack any new German
heavy coastal batteries. As Fuller did not mention Gibb’s project, it is clear that he had
still not been informed. The next day Fremantle noted on Fuller’s memo that he sup-
ported his plans director. He also made clear that the preparations for blocking of the
northern ports had been completed. The new barrier should be prepared, including an
open, protected war channel along the English coast, and bases for supporting the new
line should be identified. On 16 April Wemyss added that he agreed with Fremantle in
principle, but he did not consider the crisis acute. Thereafter Fremantle told Fuller to
start planning, however without considering the work urgent. 12
Gibb had been refining his plan when the new crisis broke. Using the idea from
a young naval officer he proposed Hope that ”X-lighters” (motorised landing craft)
were given to each demolition unit for mobility when working and for ensured evacua-

11 Ibid.: W.E. Wemyss Most Secret “F – P scheme” to Civil Engineer-in-Chief of 5-4- 1918;. GH (initial.) “Very
Secret” to C-in-C Portsmouth 5-4-1918; M.00295 Very Secret to The Commander in Chief, H.M. Ships and
Vessels, Portsmouth of 5-4-1918; “F.P.Scheme” Naval Personnel Required; Gibb (sign.) D.O.P 0151/18 to
Second Civil Lord of 8-4-1918; AFP (initial.) D.O.P. 0151/18 Secret to Deputy First Sea Lord of 8. April
1918; F.P. Scheme (first page marked “Table of Contents”) of 3-4-1918.
12 Ibid.: Plans Division, P.D. 061, Secret, ”Suggested Naval Policy in Event of British Army’s Retirement til
D.C.N.S og C.N.S. af 12-4-1918.