Page 319 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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effective anti-submarine nets, equipped with hydrophones and magnetic sensors, each
armed with two 10,5 cm pieces and have a crew of 100. Work constructing the caissons
5
would start in June 1918. When ready, the scheme would be the final solution to the
U-boat problem in the Channel.

Operation MICHAEL & Gibb’s ”F.P. Scheme” March-April 1918
On 21 March Germany started the offensive to defeat the British and French armies
before the Americans could arrive in strength. Its first phase was named MICHAEL.
Two days later Geddes notified Wemyss that even if a German break-through along the
Somme was unlikely, it could not be ruled out. If the enemy took Amiens and reached
the coast, the BEF would withdraw towards the Channel ports thereafter the Allied ar-
mies would be split in two with communication between them depending on moves by
sea. A break-through to the coast would also give Germany control of ports in northern
France, including possibly Havre and harbours in Normandy, including the Cherbourg
naval base. Wemyss should discuss the possibility with the U.S. Navy planners in Lon-
don as well as with the army including its new representative at Foch’ headquarters.
Geddes noted that Henry Wilson was already considering how the allied armies should
react to a break-through. It might be necessary to call for an extraordinary meeting of
the Allied Naval Council.
6
The Naval Staff now started preparations according to Fuller’s February memoran-
dum. However, seemingly unaware of the staff’s activities, Rear-Admiral George Hope,
7
the ”Deputy First Sea Lord”, launched another response. On 28 March he started a pro-
ject aimed at minimising the effect of German capture of Channel ports, using the fact
that Gibb was available. The civil engineer received the draft directive for project”F.P.”
the same day. He should develop a plan for making Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne,
Dieppe, Loire and other ports that could be U-boat bases unusable for the enemy. He
should co-operate with the navy’s demolition experts from the training centre HMS
VERNON and make the plan ready for execution when directed. If it became necessary
to execute the plan, his should personally command the operation and co-ordinate with
the British Army authorities in France. The fact that Hope did not direct Gibb to involve
the army in the planning phase and the order to command implementation show that
the admiral failed to understand how the situation might be at implementation. Wemyss
had extensive experience from Gallipoli with joint practical work with the army. He had
been responsible for part of the evacuation. However, his deputy, Hope, had spent the
middle part of the war in a purely naval and staff context directing the Admiralty War
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Staff Operations Division.

5 Godfrey Harrison: Alexander Gibb. The Story of an Engineer. (London 1950), pp.91-94; http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Admiralty_M-N_Scheme.
6 TNA, ADM 137/710: E. C. Geddes. URGENT. PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL to FIRST SEA LORD of 23-
3-1918.
7 That preparations started is clear form later documents.
8 Ibid.: F.P. Draft 28-3-1918 to Civil Engineer-in-Chief.