Page 322 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

322 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Staff Director of Operations. The army logisticians would not be involved. Gibb should
contact Whigham directly in case of doubt. The materiel, stores and equipment neces-
sary for the training and the operation itself would be transferred from the army to the
navy to be used for “special purposes”. 10
Whigham was right in his 1 April observation that the German operation was run-
ning out of steam. The offensive the previous day against Amiens had been contained
relatively easily. The final push towards the same objective on 4 April made so little
progress that Erich Ludendorff ended Operation Michael. Where the British general was
wrong was in the estimate of when the Germans would attack again. The next offensive
followed on 9 April, after four days, not four months.
In spite of the optimism of the first days of April, there was agreement that the Gibb’s
project should move ahead. The engineer would develop the detailed plan that could
justify the requirement for support from the army, and Gibb received the final project
directive on 5 April. It named eleven ports from the mouth of the Somme to the eastern
coast of Normandy. Gibb should make the planning and preparations in co-operation
with the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. If the plan was to be executed, Gibb would
command the force. He would be directly subordinated to Wemyss. Together with the
British Army authorities in France he would take the actions necessary to achieve the
intended results. The outline command relations and responsibilities both ignored the
need to co-ordinate with the Naval Staff planning and the need to have a local joint unity
of command that mirrored the possible situation. Gibb should request the necessary
naval and marine personnel directly from the ”Second Sea Lord”. It was now a total of
340. The army should be asked to find the rest. On the same day Hope sent C-in-C Ports-
mouth, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, a directive for his support to Gibb’s force. When
mobilised, the eleven demolition units would move to Portsmouth to await embarkation.
Gibb sent what he considered his nearly complete plan to Arthur Pease on 8 April.
It had been developed from 3 to 7 April. It numbered the eleven ports and used those
numbers for the tailored demolition units. There was still no co-ordination with Fuller’s
staff division’s planning for the northern ports, which, of course, was still acceptable as
long as there was no direct mission overlap. The two destruction plans had up till them
been aimed at different ports. This now changed. The engineer had noted that the plan
had to be revised and more personnel trained if it was to cover Boulogne, Calais and
Dunkerque as well, and on 7 April it was decided to include these ports in his project.
He noted that he would command the force, now named ”F.P. Force”, and if ordered
to execute to do so in co-ordination with the British Army authorities in France. The
force should have a regular army officer as deputy commander. All stores, equipment
and explosives would be placed in a depot in Southwick, where the post-mobilisation
training and preparation of the 81 officers and 1587 other ranks from the army, navy and
marines would take place. The code word ”Fireworks” would be used on all telegrams
related to the plan. Even if Gibb now noted that it was a precondition that the French
had approved the demolitions and the local British army commander had received green

10 Ibid.: Alexander Gibb, Most Secret, ”F-P Scheme” of 1-4-1918; Whigham, Dictated, Most Secret, to Rear-
Admiral G.P.W. Hope, C.B. of 3-4-1919.