Page 324 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

324 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

tion thereafter. Whigham had now left his War Office position and the support of Gibb
had been moved to the General Staff ”Director of Staff Duties”, Major-General Arthur
Lynden-Bell. On 12 April Bell informed Gibb that his personnel request would not be
met until it became necessary. The army was analysing the plan, and the general under-
lined that only the preparations for Dunkerque were urgent. It might be necessary to
destroy its harbour in the immediate future and with only a short warning. Hope was
asked to arrange that a demolition unit could be dispatched there with 12 hours’ notice
and inform Lynden-Bell about what support it would need from the army.
Hope reacted immediately. He informed the army that Gibb proposed that the Treport
and Havre units were joined into an ad hoc demolition unit for Dunkerque. The remain-
ing nine units might be combined to destroy Calais and Boulogne if it was decided that
they would not be needed further south. To live up to the 12 hours readiness, the force
headquarters of the two units for Dunkerque had to be mobilised without delay. If the cri-
13
sis also included Calais and Boulogne, the rest of the force should be mobilised as well.
The involved army authorities held a crisis meeting with Gibb on 13 April, and the next
day Gibb informed Hope by his minutes that the Home Army would send a Field Engi-
th
neer Squadron to Southwick on the 15 if the personnel from the navy and marines were
also sent. According to Gibb’s information, Admiral Colville had already alerted the
navy personnel. The Dunkerque ad hoc unit would have a total strength of around 600
and bring 27 tons of explosives as well as 36 tons of stores and equipment. Gibb now
complained that the army, probably without bad intent, had given the BEF Headquarters
command and responsibility for the demolition. He considered this to be contrary to
earlier agreements about his responsibility. To put the army base commandants in charge
would have the unfortunate effect of placing navy personnel under army command, and
Gibb would lose some of “his” very important “Admiralty M-N Scheme” engineers
for an unlimited period. He seemed unaware that this scheme would become irrelevant
it the Germans gained control of the Flanders coast. Gibb informed Hope that the BEF
commander, Field Marshal Douglas Haig, had been asked to give three days’ notice
before he evacuated Dunkerque. This, however, was insufficient for practical reasons.
If it would not be possible to give four days’ notice, the Dunkerque unit should deploy
to Portsmouth immediately, ready for embarkation. That would create accommodation
problems and tie up the navy destroyers necessary for the operation. 14
The need for a longer warning from Haig finally led to the French being involved.
On 15 April one of Lynden-Bell’s staff officers informed Hope that the General Staff
Director of Operations, Major-General Frederick Maurice, then visiting the BEF Head-
quarters, had been asked to enquire if it would be possible to increase the warning time
from three to four days. Bell also informed Hope that the demolition unit would only be
responsible for the preparation work. The army would order the execution of the demoli-
tion. Thus Hope had to disappoint Gibb.

13 Ibid.: Gibb, Archway Block, South, Admiralty, Secret, F.P.Scheme, to The Deputy First Sea Lord of 12-8-
1918; Bell, M.O.1., F.P.2., F.P.Scheme” Secret and Personal to Deputy First Sea Lord of 12-4-1918; Hope
DOP.0151 Secret to D.C.I.G.S. of 12-4-1918.
14 Ibid.: Gibb to Deputy First Sea Lord of 14-4-1918.