Page 329 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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Hope that the ad hoc improvisation of the April crisis should not be a permanent solu-
tion. He had therefore planned four additional demolition units, tailored to destroy the
four northern ports. The personnel needed to man the new total of fifteen units added-up
to more than 3.000. However, the dependence on army engineer troops would gradually
fall, when the growing corps of Royal Marine Engineers became able to replace them.
A separate part of the army camp in Shoreham should be established for F.P.Force. It
should have training facilities for three companies of marine engineers and depots for
the explosives, stores and equipment. The “12th Detachment” for Dunkerque should
also be in Shoreham, ready to embark in Portsmouth with six hours’ warning. The unit
was large enough to destroy three different ports instead, such as Nieuport, Calais and
Boulogne, however this was intended twelve more hours’ of warning was needed to
adjust stores and ammunition to adjust to the new tasks. One week later Gibb pressed
for the establishment of the F.P.Force HQ and to have his minimum requirement for
signals personnel covered. On 17 May the engineer had the adjusted instructions for the
Dunkerque demolition ready. They were sent to Commodore Lynes for comments with
the information that he should act as Gibbs local representative. 22
On 24 May the Admiralty informed Admiral Keyes that agreement had been reached
between British and French representatives about the evacuation and destruction of
Dunkerque. Lynes would command the work, acting under the “direction” of the French
port “governor”. However Keyes’ response on 2 June underlined that Gibb’s lack of
understanding and knowledge of local conditions made his planning pure London desk
work. A French port governor was only a mid-level official responsible for the port’s
workshops and storage facilities. Lynes’ partner could only be Admiral Ronarc’h. This
was confirmed a couple of days later by the Naval Staff that tried to save Gibb’s face by
23
only noting that his description of responsibilities had created a certain ambiguity. Not
seeking insight and co-ordination where his project had to be executed, Gibb’s solutions
became theoretical and potentially fault-ridden. Still the French seems to have been left
without knowledge of the other fourteen demolition projects.
26 May was the last day before the Germans opened the next phase of their offensive
and thereby reduced the threat against the northern ports. On that day the Royal Air
Force informed the Admiralty that the Kent east coast bases of Manstone and Walmer
24
had been selected for evacuated maritime air squadrons from the Dunkerque area. On
the same day Gibb answered Lynden-Bell’s 21 May proposal that the army initially only
earmarked key cadres for the three demolition units for the northern ports. The engineer

22 TNA, ADM 137/710, Civil Engineer-in-Chief, Secret, D.O.P. 0151 til Deputy First Sea Lord of 5-5-1918;
Civil Engineer-in-Chief, D.O.P. 0151 to Deputy First Sea Lord of 13-5-1918; Secret Instructions by Colonel
Sir Alexander Gibb, K.B.E., C.B., Commanding the F.P.Force of 17-5-1918; Civil Engineer-in-Chief, Secret
and Personal, to The Commodore, Dunkirk, of 18-5-1918.
23 Ibid.: Admiralty, for secretary, M.00304, Very Secret til The Vice Admiral, Dover Patrol of 24-5-1918;
Vice-Admiral, Dover Patrol, No. 2123/002 to Secretary of the Admiralty af 2-6-1918; Memo of 2-6-1918
“Responsibility for the Port of Dunkerque” with notes by Pound and Fremantle from 4-6-1918; Admiralty,
M.05342/18, Very Secret to The Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office of 4-6-1918 .
24 Ibid.: V.A. Dover No. 2012/002 #Plans for evacuation of Squadrons og 61st Wing” of 26-5-1918; Headquarters,
5 Group, R.A.F. to Vice-Admiral Dover (Through Commodore, Dunkirk) of 23-5-1918.
th