Page 330 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

330 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

agreed in principle. Due to the large size of these units they would have roughly the
manpower needed if sent to the eleven southern ports instead. The difference was only 38
officers and 187 other ranks. However, if that solution was chosen, it would only be pos-
sible to destroy either the northern or the southern ports, and if it was thereafter decided
to destroy the other group of ports as well, the force depot should have the necessary per-
sonnel reserves to replace losses during the first mission. According to Gibb this meant
that the minimum force total strength should include what was necessary for the northern
ports plus the outlined supplement needed for the southern ports plus the replacements
for losses. He also noted that even if the personnel could be used twice, it would be nec-
25
essary to maintain tailored stocks of explosives and stores for each of the fifteen ports.
On 3 June Hope pressed the War Office for information about army detachments for
Gibb’s force. This led to a meeting in the General Staff between all the involved authori-
ties in the London area. Gibb was represented by James. Here it became clear that was
extremely difficult for the army to find the required specialists. No trained engineer subu-
nits were available for detachment, and James had to accept untrained labour companies
instead. He also had to accept that the army could only ear-mark, not detach the needed
approximately 100 engineer officers and NCOs. The required drivers, interpreters and
signallers would be able to meet in Shoreham within 48 hours if necessary. 26
At the same time the Admiralty made a decision about how to co-ordinate the work
th
of Ker’s “12 Detachment” and Fuller’s Dunkerque block ships. The Naval Staff Di-
rector of Operations, Captain Dudley Pound, found that Commodore Lynes should be
given command of both. The decision also outlined solutions for other ports. If a port
was without a senior naval representative, the maritime area commander should com-
mand both efforts under the guidance of the local army commandant. It is clear that it
was then practically impossible to describe and establish an effective command relation-
ship between elements of the two services as each totally rejected subordination of its
units to the other’s commanders. On 10 June Gibb noted that the army had broken the
agreement that the only authority the army commanders would have was to order the
execution of a demolition. Hope, who had now been reduced to the engineer’s agent,
passed-on the protest to Major-General Charles Harington. He had now taken over the
position of Wilson’s deputy. Harington answered on 13 June that he had asked the Ad-
miralty one week earlier to appoint senior naval officers who could lead the destruc-
tion of Calais and Boulogne. To avoid friction with the French, such an officer should
combine a suitable high rank with a permanent posting to the port. The general made
undiplomatically clear that if this was not possible, Haig’s headquarters thought that the
navy’s only task was simply to give support by making trained demolition units with a
thoroughly prepared destruction plan available. The army would not accept that the navy
pressed their representative in between the demolition unit and the base commandant
just before the execution.

25 Ibid.: Gibb, Secret, D.O.P. 0151 til D.C.I.G.S. af 26-5-1918.
26 Deputy First Sea Lord, Secret and Personal, D.O.P. 0151 to D.C.I.G.S af 3-6-1918; Proceedings of a
Conference … to consider certain questions with regards to the provision of personnel required to form
detachments for use in certain eventualities of 6-6-1918.