Page 321 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
commander. However, he does not seem to have made this point clear or convincingly
to Geddes. The admiral wrote Wilson to propose that the project was developed in co-
operation between the General Staff and the Admiralty with Hope responsible on the
navy’s side. The navy should have the responsibility to organise the demolition force
with commander, equipment and personnel, but at the same time he made clear that
the control of the execution would be the local army commander’s responsibility. The
navy demolition force should only be responsible if there was no army presence. It was
another point he did not make clear internally in the Admiralty, and it was contrary to
what Hope had led Gibb to expect. Wemyss seemed to consider that it was the army’s
responsibility to involve the French. The Royal Navy’s role was purely technical. It was
something that Gibb would consider completely insufficient and unacceptable during
the following 3-4 months, however without understanding that any larger role for the
navy would include a responsibility for co-ordinating with French authorities.
At the end of his letter Wemyss asked Wilson to accept that Gibb took direct contact
with the senior general staff officer appointed as responsible for the project support.
Wilson answered the next day that he had chosen the Deputy Chief of the Imperial Gen-
eral Staff, Major General Robert Whigham. Whigham’s position in the War Office was
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roughly similar to Hope’s in the Admiralty. The first contact and co-ordination meeting
took place on 1 April between Whigham, Hope and the engineer with Gibb writing the
minutes. Gibb noted that the army considered that in case of a port city evacuation its
commanders would be so busy with other matters that it wanted the navy to prepare
and carry out the demolitions. The navy elements should only liaise and co-ordinate
with the local army base commandants who might be able to assist with some person-
nel and equipment. According to Gibb’s minutes nobody in the meeting seemed aware
that timing and practical character and sequence of the demolition might be of central
importance to the local army commander withdrawing from a harbour city in combat
with a risk of being cut off. However, the reason may have been that neither Whigham
nor Wilson saw a German break-through as an immediate threat. The major-general
thought that another critical situation might arise four months later when the Germans
were ready for their next attempt.
Gibb had asked for a decision about which ports should be included in his demolition
project, and the Admiralty had decided that the preparation should cover the area from
the Somme to Normandy east of Cherbourg. Whigham had agreed that the French would
veto the inclusion of the main Normandy port. He had also agreed with the Admiralty
that Rouen was too far in-land to fit the project concept, and he accepted Gibb’s proposal
to make the Zeebrugge and Ostend reconstruction companies available if the Admi-
ralty could document the requirement by a detailed project plan. Hope had informed the
meeting that Captain Henry Skipwith, the commander of the mine and torpedo centre,
HMS VERNON, would support Gibb. On 3 April Whigham informed Hope that infor-
mation about the sensitive project would be limited to himself, Wilson, and the General

9 Ibid.: Alexander Gibb (sign.) F-P- Scheme of 29-3-1918 to 2nd Civil Lord; AFP (initial.) To the First Sea
Lord of 29-8-1918; Wemyss (initial.) Most Secret to D.1.S.L. of 30-3-1918; Secret & Personal “My Dear
General” of 30-3-1919; Letter War Office Sunday 31-3-1918 “My dear Admiral”.