Page 316 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

316 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Preparing Fireworks on the French Coast: British crisis me-
asures for a German break-through to the Channel Coast

February-October 1918.

Michael HESSELHOLT CLEMMESEn

hen looking for strategy level British reactions to the German 1918 Spring Of-
W fensive in the British National Archives in Kew five years ago, the author came
across a Royal Navy case file that outlined planned and prepared reactions to a success-
ful German Western Front break-through and occupation of more of the Channel coast.
The foreseen measures included not only the sinking of block ships when abandoning
ports to delay their use as German forward U-boat bases. Preparations under the code
word FIREWORKS covered the destruction of the entire French port infrastructure from
the Flanders to eastern Normandy.

The general situation winter-early spring 1918
During 1917 the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, had succeeded in out-
manoeuvring the armed service leaderships and enhancing his own and War Cabinet’s
control of the strategic direction and resource management of the war. The new power
relationship was clearly demonstrated by the purge late in December of the professional
naval chief, the First Sea Lord, Admiral John Jellicoe. The First Lord of the Admiralty
– the British navy secretary – Eric Geddes had demanded his removal. Jellicoe was
replaced by his far more pragmatic deputy, Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss. In mid-February
1918 the already weakened army chief, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Gen-
eral William Robertson, was forced out and replaced by the highly politically literate
Francophile, General Henry Wilson, who came from the position as the chief of the
permanent British representation at the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander,
Marshal Ferdinand Foch.
The generals considered it certain that the Germans would launch a massive offen-
sive on the Western Front in spring 1918. They thought that the Germans would use the
window of opportunity created by Russia’s collapse that freed enough forces to try to
succeed in the West before the Americans could deploy in strength. The British political
leaders decided to see a massive German offensive in France as unlikely due to their
own experience with such endeavours.
In December 1917 the ”A-section” of General Henry Wilson’s staff in Foch’ Head-
quarters had analysed the Allied problems, options and priorities, and the section chief,
Brigadier General Herbert Studd, presented the findings. He noted that the British com-
munications lines were close and nearly parallel to the front and therefore vulnerable.
The whole British position depended upon the defence of the ports of Dunkerque, Calais