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always present among top officers. Internal contrasts among the armed forces were also
existing. It was exemplary the rivalry between the Commission, formed by army of-
ficers, and the Navy, which avoided to promote the diffusion of its products and even
refused to drop leaflets which could convince Italians living in Istria and Dalmatia that
Rome intended to abandon them and the nationalist program of expansion into Balkans.
In summer, Italian internal crises added to those among the allies. For instance, and
remarkably, no member of the Commission took part in the important meeting of the al-
lies about propaganda held in August in England, and the leaving Italian representative
was heavily criticized.
In all, during the summer 1918, decisive was the crisis of the Italian policy of nation-
alities. This crisis obviously had an origin different from the Commission. The Minister
of Foreign Affairs Sonnino, the King, the Navy and generally the more nationalistic cir-
cles imposed a re-orientation of the Italian policy about the Balkans which went beyond
all previous positions favourable to the independence of various Balkan nationalities.
This return to sacred egotism implied that Rome expected a kind of “compensation”, in
the form of territorial occupations or of influence, for those lands. This made less believ-
able its former attitude in favour of a Yugoslavian kingdom. All this further disillusioned
Ojetti and reduced the Commission’s commitment, which not casually saw the number
of printed leaflets diminish. And this exactly in the war final weeks, wherein a deeper
commitment would have been essential.
In conclusion, contradictions and divisions of Italian politics and, more generally, of
propaganda could not be kept away from the Commission’s work, which was much less
“peaceful” and “unanimous” than it has always been considered.
Obviously, this did not completely stop its work, but made it more difficult and less
safe. It is certain that it became more routine and bureaucratic in the last weeks. It is
not a coincidence that Ojetti asked the Prime Minister to be on leave for four months
exactly in September, some weeks before the end of the war, and just when he could
have reaped the fruits of his intense and remarkable activity, had he shared all of it. He
obviously felt defeated by the prevailing nationalist-expansionist program and by the
success of military.

As it often happens in the history of war propaganda, it is not known how much this
information-disinformation activity carried out by the Inter-allied Commission for Prop-
aganda for the Enemy contributed to prepare the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian
army in autumn 1918. In short, it is not known what was more conclusive, either the
leaflets or the hunger and rebellion mounting behind the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, in
their territories. Maybe a unique answer cannot be right. It is certain that the Commis-
sion’s leaflets, because of their quantity if not always for their quality, played their role.
A research in the Austrian archives different from the pioneering but now incomplete
study carried out by Cornwall, could offer concrete answers. What Cornwall very well
documents is the Austrians’ fear and their commitment to oppose the Italian propaganda
by means of a counter-propaganda. This is at least an answer, although not a direct one.
But other conclusions can be drawn.