Page 447 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
Analysis
Applying the principle of military necessity (and unnecessary suffering and propor-
tionality) to Freyberg’s insistence that Monte Cassino be bombed, what evidence can be
marshaled to support each position, and what conclusions may be drawn?
For Freyberg: First, the Abbey was in enemy territory, and was on a key piece of
terrain blocking the Allied advance on Rome. Second, Freyberg’s intent was to destroy
an enemy target and, even if he believed that the Germans were not in the monastery, it
was not unreasonable for him to conclude that they might occupy it once the battle com-
menced. Third, and finally, Freyberg was concerned about the risk to his own soldiers.
As Freyberg put it to Clark when insisting that the Abbey must be bombed, Clark would
“have to take the responsibility” for the dead New Zealanders, Indians and British that
would result if the Germans in fact were in the Abbey. 16
For Clark: First, the monastery was a world famous cultural and religious object and
should be protected. Second, the Germans were not using it for military purpose – which
would have been a violation of the law of war and deprived the Abbey of any protected
status. While Generals Eaker and Devers insisted that they had seen enemy activity in
or around the Abbey, others had not. Major General Geoffrey Keyes, for example, had
taken his plane up and flown over the monastery; he reported that he had seen no signs
of enemy activity. Third and finally, if the Abbey were destroyed, the Germans would
17
now use the rubble to defend the position from attack. Said Clark: “If the Germans are
not in the monastery now, they certainly will be in the rubble after the bombing ends.” 18

Conclusion
Freyberg’s intent was to destroy an enemy position, rather than a religious site. Al-
exander, who conceded that Clark’s points were valid, ultimately decided against him
for one reason: “Bricks and mortar, no matter how venerable, cannot be allowed to
weigh against human lives.” Freyberg was “a very important cog in the commonwealth
effort. I would be most reluctant to take responsibility for his failing and for his telling
his people: ‘I lost five thousand New Zealanders because they wouldn’t let me use the
19
air as I wanted.’”
Clark finally acquiesced---but not before he wrote that it was “too bad unnecessarily
to destroy one of the art treasures of the world.” Of course, Clark was correct: Frey-
berg’s tactical incompetence in insisting that the Abbey be destroyed “brought no mili-
20
tary advantage of any kind,” wrote the author of the official British history of the event.
Post-war investigations also revealed that the Germans in fact had been scrupulous about
avoiding any military use of the monastery. Lieutenant General Fridolin von Senger und
Etterlin, the Wehrmacht commander in charge of the Cassino front, even avoided look-

16 Atkinson, note 3, at 434.
17 Ibid., 433.
18 Ibid., 434.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., at 440.