Page 444 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

444 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

ous invasion at Anzio. Since Anzio was only thirty miles south of Rome---and behind
German lines---the idea was that the 50,000 British and American troops comprising
the U.S. VI Corps would wade ashore there, move inland, and outflank the Gustav Line.
They would then link-up with Alexander’s forces, and drive on to Rome. It did not work
out as planned, however, and Anzio became yet another stalemate.
The Allies now decided to re-double their efforts on the Gustav Line around Cassino,
and General Alexander chose the newly arrived 2nd New Zealand, 4th Indian, and 8th
British Divisions, under the command of New Zealand Lieutenant General Sir Bernard
Freyberg, to lead the upcoming assault. Freyberg, who had been awarded the Victoria
Cross in World War I, studied the maps and terrain of the area, and decided that the Al-
lies must take Monte Cassino if they were to advance on Rome.
How should this mountain peak be captured? Major General F. I. S. Tuker, in com-
mand of the Indian Division, decided that the monastery located on the peak of Monte
Cassino must be destroyed as part of the capture of Monte Cassino. He made this deci-
sion after driving into Naples, going into a bookshop, and finding a book published in
1879 that described the Abbey’s construction, dimensions, and thickness of its walls. In
Tuker’s view, it was “unreasonable to ask his men to move against a position that was
1
crowned by an enormous, intact fortress.” Tuker did not care whether the Germans were
in the monastery or not, as he was convinced that the enemy would move into the abbey
once the battle started and, once in the Abbey, would only with great difficulty---and at
the cost of many lives---be dislodged.
Tuker convinced Freyberg that the Abbey must be destroyed and, when Freyberg
asked Major General John Cannon, the commander of the U.S. Twelfth Air Force, if the
monastery could be destroyed from the air, Cannon replied: “If you let me use the whole
of our bomber force against Cassino we will whip it out like a dead tooth.” Cannon’s
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statement (which seems rather foolish) reflected the prevailing view of American (and
British) airmen that victory could be achieved through airpower: they would destroy
Monte Cassino with blockbuster bombs, and then the infantry would simply move in.
General Clark and other ground commanders, however, were not convinced. They
were strongly opposed to the bombing for two reasons. First, the Hague and Geneva Con-
ventions required that religious and cultural buildings be spared from the ravages of com-
bat. In fact, the Combined Chiefs had recently advised General Dwight D. Eisenhower
that churches and “all religious institutions shall be respected and all efforts made to
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preserve the local archives, historical and classical monuments, and objects of art.” But-
--and Clark and opponents of the bombing knew this---a religious or cultural icon could
be attacked and destroyed if this were required by “military necessity.” Consequently,
their second reason for opposing the bombing was that there was, in fact, no sound mili-
tary reason for bombing the Abbey. Not only was there no compelling evidence that the
Germans were using the monastery for any military purpose but, if the religious site were
bombed, then the Germans definitely would move into the rubble that remained and set
1 Robert Wallace, The Italian Campaign (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life, 1978), 141.
2 Id.
3 Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2007), 432.