Page 443 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
The Bombing of Monte Cassino in 1944:
Was it Reasonable? Was it Lawful?

Fred L. BORCH

Introduction
he sixth century Abbey of Monte Cassino was the cradle of the Benedictine mo-
T nastic order. In February 1944, the fortified town below the Abbey was a critical
part of the German Gustav line, and consequently was holding up American Lieutenant
General Mark Clark’s 5th Army from advancing to Rome.
Indian troops under the command of New Zealand Lieutenant General Bernard Frey-
berg were directed to attack the town of Cassino. Afraid that German troops were watch-
ing from the Abbey, and would direct artillery fire upon them, Freyberg requested that
the Abbey be bombed.
General Clark resisted the bombing. He argued that it was not reasonable to attack
the building because military necessity did not require it. Clark argued that the mon-
astery should not be bombed because: (1) of the Abbey’s importance as a cultural and
religious monument; (2) there was no credible evidence it was being used for military
purposes by the enemy, and; (3) if reduced to rubble in an attack, the ruins would be
occupied by the Germans, who could construct almost impregnable defensive positions.
Clark’s hand was forced, however, by Freyberg, who was supported by British Gen-
eral Harold Alexander, Clark’s superior officer in the combined command arrangement.
The Abbey, occupied only by monks and civilians (who had taken refuge there to escape
the fighting), was demolished in a series of air raids.
Not a single German soldier was killed---as none were near the abbey. The Vatican
called the bombing “a piece of gross stupidity.” Professor (and USCMH member) Allan
R. Millett called it “one of the most inexcusable bombings of the war.”
This paper will discuss the principle of “military necessity” in the attack on Monte
Cassino. Was the bombing of this historic religious site justified by military necessity?
What about its importance as the cradle of the Benedictine monastic order? To what
extent does a structure’s cultural significance preclude its destruction in combat? Did
Freyberg’s belief that the abbey was an enemy position, or might become an enemy
position, mean the attack on Monte Cassino was reasonable? Or did Clark’s reasons for
declining to attack the cultural icon make it unreasonable to bomb it? Finally, what does
the Law of Armed Conflict say about the attack on the Abbey?

Background
By the beginning of 1944, the Allied 15th Army Group under Field Marshall Sir Har-
old Alexander was stalled at the “Gustav Line,” the name given to the German defensive
positions in the mountains south of Rome. To break this stalemate, Alexander planned
a frontal assault on the Gustav Line, which would be supported by an Allied amphibi-