Page 448 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

448 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

ing out of the windows of the Abbey when he visited the abbot for dinner---because he
21
might inadvertently see Allied positions below. Of course, Freyberg and Alexander did
not know this at the time they decided to attack the Abbey, so these facts cannot be part
of the calculus in weighing the reasonableness of their decision.
The destruction of the Monte Cassino monastery is a good example of what military
necessity meant in a war of attrition---as the fighting in Italy had become by February
22
1944. The British military strategist J.F.C. Fuller called it “sheer tactical stupidity”
and, while this means that Freyberg’s decision was foolish, it was not unreasonable
when evaluated using the principle of “military necessity.” This is because Freyberg’s
intent (supported by General Alexander) was to destroy an enemy position (and not a re-
ligious building), and there was a reasonable basis for Freyberg (and Alexander) to be-
lieve that the destruction of this enemy position was necessary under the circumstances.
What lessons may be drawn from the destruction of Monte Cassino in examining and
evaluating other decisions to attack targets?
(1) Determining what constitutes military necessity is a duty of the battlefield com-
mander;
(2) The law presumes good faith on the part of the commander; it presumes that given
the information available to him at the time he made his decision, military neces-
sity reasonably required that he take the action he did.
As for evaluating the decision after it has been made, the test is whether a reasonably
prudent commander, knowing what the commander who ordered the attack knew, would
have acted similarly in similar circumstances.
The definition of military necessity, and how it is evaluated by commanders, is un-
likely to change. This only underscores what the German strategist Carl von Clausewitz
said about war: that it is “fog” and “friction.”
In sum, the claim that the bombing of Monte Cassino was a piece of gross stupidity
may well be true. But, when the decision to attack the monastery is evaluated in light of
the principle of military necessity, it was not unreasonable and not illegal under the law.

Sources:
Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2007)
Barnett, Correlli (ed.) Hitler’s Generals (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989)
Field Manual 27-10, The Law of War (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1940)
Hapgood, David & David Richardson, Monte Cassino (New York: Congdon & Weed,
1984).
Murray, Williamson & Allan R. Millett, A War to be Won (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press, 2000)
Rogers, A.V.P. Law on the Battlefield, 2d ed. (Manchester, UK: Juris, 2004)
Solis, Gary D. The Law of Armed Conflict. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010).

21 Ibid., at 436.
22 Ibid, at 441.