Page 458 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

458 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

was imperative to move the large Romanian units from the east, to regroup them to the
south of Carpathians, to settle the rapports with the former ally and to establish relations
with the command of the Soviet forces, now in full offensive.
Under extremely fluid and tensioned conditions, the Romanian General Staff, headed
by General Gheorghe Mihail, appointed by decree by King Michael I in the evening
11
of August 23, was given the task to establish the strategic concept and to coordinate the
large Romanian units in the area under the jurisdiction of the Romanian state, which,
at that time, totaled over 150 000 square kilometers. It is worth mentioning that, after
the political changes of August 23, 1944, and until September 7 same year, when the
Romanian 1 and 4 armies were subordinated to the Ukrainian 2 Front, the General
st
nd
th
Staff had all the command prerogatives over the large units. It was the only period
during the entire course of the Second World War (1941-1945) when the Romanian
armed forces found themselves under national command.
The concept of the operation of “turning the weapons” (against the former ally),
established between August 23 and August 31, 1944, materialized in the operative
directives issued by the General Staff. The first such directive was issued in the
afternoon of August 23, 1944 (General Staff Order no. 678 563). It ordered the cessation
of hostilities against the Soviet army and ended the subordination of Romanian units
to German command. At the same time, it instructed Romanian troops to oppose any
German attempt to disarm them or to occupy public institutions.
In this first stage, the new Romanian government wanted to settle the rapports with
the former ally amiably. For instance, both King Michael I and Constantin Sănătescu,
the new prime minister, held talks with German representatives in Romania, asking
them to take note of the new political orientation of the Romanian state and to avoid
direct confrontations. There are documents that imply that the new authorities were
willing to offer a 15 day respite for the German troops to leave Romanian territory.
After a few hours, the General Staff issued the second operative directive, which
established the strategic concept and the missions of the large units. According to the
document, the political goal of the operation was the cessation of “the fighting alongside
German troops, in order to make peace with the United Nations and to fight alongside its
troops in order to liberate Northern Transylvania” . The directive also stipulated that,
12
from that moment, “all Romanian land, air and naval forces are no longer under German
authority and are placed under the command of King Michael I, whose orders will be
issued through the General Staff” .
13
The general operative concept had four major missions: a) to immediately cease the
hostilities against the troops of the United Nations (against Soviet troops); b) to regroup
the large Romanian units from Bessarabia and Moldova in order to subsequently use
them in the operations against the Vienna Diktat; c) to liberate the national territory from

11 Documente din Istoria Militară a Poporului Român (DIMPR), vol. I, 23-31 august 1944, eds. Ilie Petre,
colonel dr. Al.Gh. Savu, colonel Leonida Loghin, captain Mihail E. Ionescu, Editura Militară, Bucureşti,
1977, p.13.
12 Ibidem, p. 14.

13 Ibidem